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Patrick: Airline Employees Are Not Reporting Violations Because They Lack

AIRLINE EMPLOYEES ARE NOT REPORTING
VIOLATIONS BECAUSE THEY LACK
ADEQUATE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION:
ARE YOU READY FOR TAKEOFF?
I. INTRODUCTION
Dave was a mechanic for Fly High Airlines at an International
Airport for over twenty years.1 On his last shift working for the airlines,
a Boeing 737 landed safely and taxied up to the gate. 2 The pilot who
flew the plane informed the mechanics that he heard loud barrel canning
noises at his feet throughout the flight. Dave investigated the problem
before signing the plane off to fly its next route. He detected a problem
with the struts in the fuselage and noticed that the mechanical defect was
written up in the maintenance logs five times in the last week without
being repaired.3 The struts in the fuselage were manufactured in 1968,
and worn out to the extent that they caused a safety hazard in flight. At
this point, the airplane’s reliability was essentially the equivalent of a car
manufactured in the 1960s.4 Unfortunately, a plane is incapable of
pulling over if it experiences a mechanical emergency en route. Dave
grounded the plane and sent it to the hangar for maintenance. However,
the airline manager threatened to fire him if he reported the violations to
the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) and did not sign the plane
off to fly its scheduled route.5 Ironically, firing Dave and flying the plane
This hypothetical was created by the author.
See About the 737 Family, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/737family/
background.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2011) (stating that the 737 is “the world’s most
popular and reliable commercial jet”).
3
See A Glossary of Aviation Terms and Abbreviations, AEROFILES (June 30, 2008),
http://www.aerofiles.com/glossary.html (explaining that a fuselage is “[a]n aircraft’s
main body structure housing the flight crew, passengers, and cargo and to which the
wings, tail and, in most single-engined airplanes, engine are attached”); see also Terry
Ward, How Safe is Your Plane?, AOL TRAVEL NEWS (Apr. 8, 2010, 1:43 PM),
http://news.travel.aol.com/2010/04/08/how-safe-is-your-plane/ (illustrating similar
maintenance violations by Southwest Airlines). In March 2008, Southwest Airlines was
charged with a $10.2 million fine for operating 46 planes on 59,791 flights without
performing mandatory inspections for cracking in the plane’s fuselage. Id.
4
See John W. Lincoln, Managing the Aging Aircraft Problem KN-1 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFullText/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-079(II)///MP-079(II)(SM)-$KN.pdf (discussing the safety and economic implications of aging aircraft). Aging
aircrafts have the potential of deteriorating flight safety if they are not properly
maintained. Id. at KN-3. Fatigue cracking is one of the major challenges for aging aircrafts.
Id. at KN-1. In 1988, fatigue cracking in the fuselage of a Boeing 737 resulted in the loss of
the upper fuselage in flight. Id. at KN-7.
5
See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 301(a), 72 Stat. 731, 744
(establishing the Federal Aviation Agency, which later became the FAA); 63 Fed. Reg.
1
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in its unairworthy condition would have resulted in more violations for
the airline.
Dave refused to sign the plane off to fly. He sent the plane to the
hangar for maintenance and reported the violations to the FAA. Dave
was terminated. After evaluating his options, Dave decided to bring a
state whistleblower claim against Fly High Airlines instead of a federal
claim.6 Dave knew his claim had merit and did not want to go through
the hassle involved with the Federal Whistleblower Protection Program
(“WPP”), which would have required a complaint and investigation
procedure with the Department of Labor (“DOL”).7 Fly High Airlines
removed the claim to federal court and argued that the state
whistleblower claim was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act
(“ADA”), as amended by the WPP. 8
Unfortunately, the outcome of Dave’s case will depend on which
circuit is deciding the issue. Currently, there is a circuit split as to
whether the ADA, as amended by the WPP, preempts state
whistleblower claims.9 The Eighth Circuit held that state whistleblower

61206, 61316 (Nov. 9, 1998) (“The stated FAA mission is to provide a safe, secure, and
efficient global aviation system.”); see also JOHN W. FISCHER, BART ELIAS AND ROBERT S.
KIRK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34467, U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY: ISSUES AND ROLE OF
CONGRESS 11 (2008) (stating that “the FAA has been given broad authority to regulate and
promote safety within the airline industry”).
6
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009) (defining whistleblower act and
whistleblower). A whistleblower act is “[a] federal or state law protecting employees from
retaliation for properly disclosing employer wrongdoing such as violating a law or
regulation, mismanaging public funds, abusing authority, or endangering public health or
safety.” Id. A whistleblower is “[a]n employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a
governmental or law enforcement agency.” Id.; see also Jacqueline P. Taylor, The World of
Whistleblowers: Are They Sinners or Saints?, WOMENOF.COM, http://www.womenof.com/
THE_WORLD_OF_WHISTLEBLOWERS_ARE_THEY_SINNERS_OR_SAINTS-Article.aspx
(last visited Oct. 22, 2011) (explaining whistleblowers, their goals behind blowing the
whistle, and the risks they face). The common characteristics among whistleblowers are
“their ethics-driven reasons for whistleblowing, their whistleblowing experiences, and the
resulting retaliation directed at them by their adversaries.” Id. “[T]he primary goal
whistleblowers usually seek is accountability for misbehavior and correction of the
problems they see in the work place.” Id.
7
See Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) (2006) (explaining the
DOL process); infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text (explaining the complaint and
investigation procedure with the DOL).
8
See Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006) (stating the express
preemption provision of the ADA); 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (providing federal whistleblower
protection to airline employees).
9
Compare Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the WPP does not preempt state whistleblower claims), with Botz v. Omni Air
Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 498 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the flight attendant’s claim under the
Minnesota whistleblower statute was preempted by the ADA as amended by the WPP).
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claims are preempted by the WPP while the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits adopted an opposing view. 10 A resolution is necessary to ensure
airline employees are treated equally throughout the country. Adopting
the majority position, state whistleblower claims should not be held
within the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision, and the WPP does
not alter or expand this scope. Airline employees should be allowed to
bring state claims against their employers because it will encourage
violation reporting in the future, which will ensure the highest level of
aviation safety.
First, Part II of this Note will discuss the relevant statutes, the federal
preemption doctrine, and case law leading up to the circuit split
concerning whether the WPP preempts state whistleblower claims. 11
Second, Part III will analyze the opposing views taken by the circuits and
explore the problems with the Eighth Circuit’s approach of interpreting
the WPP to expand the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision. 12
Lastly, Part IV will propose two alternative solutions—an amendment to
the WPP and adoption of the majority position—to ameliorate the circuit
split, encourage violation reporting, and ensure safety remains the top
priority in the aviation industry. 13
II. BACKGROUND
Congress amended the ADA to include the WPP, which provides
federal whistleblower protection for airline employees.14 The WPP’s
statutory language is silent as to preemption; however, the circuits
disagree on whether the WPP expands the scope of the ADA’s
preemption provision to include all state whistleblower claims. 15

See generally 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (stating the ADA’s preemption clause); 49 U.S.C.
§ 42121 (adding the WPP to the ADA).
10
See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that state
whistleblower claims are not preempted by the ADA, as amended by the WPP); Gary v.
Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the addition of the WPP did not
expand the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64
(holding that state whistleblower claims are not preempted by the WPP); Botz, 286 F.3d at
498 (holding that the WPP preempts state whistleblower claims).
11
See infra Part II (explaining the history and purpose behind the ADA and its
preemption provision, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the preemption provision, the
WPP, and the opposing views in the circuits regarding the WPP and whether it expands
the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision).
12
See infra Part III (analyzing the split in the circuits regarding the WPP and whether it
expands the scope of the ADA’s preemption clause).
13
See infra Part IV (explaining possible solutions to the circuit split).
14
See infra Part II.D (discussing the federal remedy for airline whistleblowers).
15
See infra Part II.E (discussing the circuit split).
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Part II.A will begin with a brief history of the ADA, providing the
foundation necessary to understand the purpose behind its preemption
clause.16 After introducing the ADA, Part II.B will discuss the ADA’s
preemption clause and the federal preemption doctrine. 17 Next, Part II.C
will examine two Supreme Court cases that interpreted the language and
scope of the preemption clause.18 Then, Part II.D will explore the
relevant portions of the WPP.19 Lastly, Part II.E will journey through the
two different positions the circuit courts have taken as to whether the
ADA, as amended by the WPP, preempts state whistleblower claims. 20
A. History of the ADA
The airline industry was heavily regulated long before the passage of
the ADA in 1978.21 Since 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”)
regulated all domestic interstate air travel.22 The Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (“1958 Act”) gave the CAB authority to regulate airfares, routes,
and services of the interstate airline industry along with the power to

See infra Part II.A (explaining the history and purpose of the ADA).
See infra Part II.B (explaining federal preemption of state law and the ADA’s
preemption provision).
18
See infra Part II.C (explaining the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the language in
the ADA’s preemption provision).
19
See infra Part II.D (discussing the enactment of the WPP).
20
See infra Part II.E (discussing the two opposing views in the circuit courts regarding
the WPP and whether it alters the scope of the ADA’s preemption clause).
21
See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 29–30 (2010)
[hereinafter AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES] (explaining how “the federal Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) had regulated all domestic interstate air transport routes as a
public utility, setting fares, routes, and schedules”).
22
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973, amended by Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731; see AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 21, at 29 (explaining how the CAB started regulating the airline industry in
1937); ELIZABETH E. BAILEY ET AL., DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 11 (Richard Schmalensee
ed., 1989) (explaining that the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 created the CAB and gave it
the authority to regulate the airline industry). The CAB consisted of a five-member
independent regulatory agency. Id. The CAB had the authority to control who entered the
industry, what routes an air carrier could enter, and who could leave the industry along
with the authority to “regulate fares . . . , award direct subsidies to air carriers, control
mergers and intercarrier agreements, . . . investigate deceptive trade practices and unfair
methods of competition, exempt carriers from certain provisions of the act,” and regulate
safety. Id.; JEFFREY R. MILLER, THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION HANDBOOK 3 (1981) (explaining
that “[o]ne of the main reasons for the Civil Aeronautics [A]ct of 1938 was to protect
existing air carriers from competition and enable the infant industry to grow”). Since 1938,
the CAB regulated the nation’s airlines, which resulted in the airlines’ remarkable growth.
Id. at 1.
16
17
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take administrative action against the airlines.23 Consequently, an
interstate airline had to apply to the CAB when it wanted a new route or
an airfare change.24 Significantly, the 1958 Act included a “saving
clause” that stated federal regulations would not interfere with state law
or common law already in existence pertaining to remedies, and it did
not include a clause preempting state law.25 In fact, the states regulated
intrastate airlines, which sold tickets at lower prices than CAB regulated
airlines and aided in prompting deregulation.26 The heavy regulation by
the CAB was inefficient and imposed high costs on consumers. 27 Thus,
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731. The 1958 Act
empowered the CAB to regulate the interstate airline industry. § 102(b), 72 Stat. at 740; see
BAILEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 11 (discussing how the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
separated safety regulation from economic regulation). Originally, the CAB had the
authority to regulate safety. Id. After the 1958 Act, the role of the CAB was to promote
“adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable rates [and] foster
competition to the extent necessary to ensure ‘sound development.’” Id.; see also MILLER,
supra note 22, at 3 (stating that the 1958 Act created the FAA and transferred the authority
to regulate airline safety to the FAA).
24
See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 30 (“The CAB earned a
reputation for bureaucratic complacency; airlines were subject to lengthy delays when
applying for new routes or fare changes, which were not often approved.”). World
Airways applied to the CAB to begin a low-fare route from New York City to Los Angeles
and it took over six years for the CAB to study the request, which they dismissed because
the record was “stale.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
25
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731, 798. “Nothing
contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at
common law or by statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies.”
Id.; see Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995) (explaining that the federal
statute did not include a preemption provision when it was first enacted). The “saving
clause stat[es] [that] [n]othing . . . in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the
remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are
in addition to such remedies.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) (stating that the “‘saving
clause’” enabled states “to regulate intrastate airfares (including those offered by interstate
air carriers),” and state regulation was not expressly preempted by the 1958 Act).
26
See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 29 (explaining how intrastate
airlines were regulated by the state governments in which they operated, and not the CAB);
see also John W. Barnum, What Prompted Airline Deregulation 20 Years Ago? What Were
the Objectives of That Deregulation and How Were They Achieved?, Presentation to the
Aeronautical Law Committee of the Business Law Section of the International Bar
Association (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://library.findlaw.com/1988/Sep/1/129304.
html (discussing the success of intrastate carriers and its effect on deregulation). Intrastate
carriers that were not regulated by the CAB were selling airline tickets at much lower
prices than the CAB regulated airlines. Id.
27
See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 30 (“Most of the major airlines,
whose profits were virtually guaranteed, favored the rigid system.”). The airlines did not
mind such heavy regulation because the passengers were the ones paying the escalating
fares. Id.; BAILEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 1 (discussing the effect of regulation and the trend
of deregulation in the mid 1970s). In the mid 1970s, it was “argued that regulation raised
23
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Congress was concerned that the airline industry would eventually
crash.28
In 1975, Congress held hearings related to airline deregulation. 29
Congress determined that “maximum reliance on competitive market
prices and limited the variety of goods and services available to consumers in many
industries.” Id. Thus, “deregulation became the rallying cry of observers of the federal
government’s regulatory agencies.” Id.; DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES vii (Sam
Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000) (discussing the purpose behind deregulation in
the network industries). In the 1970s, the United States started to deregulate a variety of
network industries, such as the energy, transportation, and communication industries. Id.
The overall purpose of deregulation was to promote competition and benefit consumers.
Id. The goal behind deregulating network industries was to allow markets to determine
the allocation of resources, rather than regulators, and stimulate competition. Id. at vii–viii.
28
See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 30 (“Congress became concerned
that air transport in the long run might follow the nation’s railroads into trouble; in 1970
the Penn Central Railroad had collapsed in what was then the largest bankruptcy in
history . . . .”); DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES, supra note 27, at 41 (discussing
deregulation in the railroad industry). The railroad industry was deregulated because its
performance under regulation was financially unsuccessful. Id. Penn Central, the nation’s
largest railroad, and a half a dozen other railroads declared bankruptcy in 1970. Id. It was
argued “that regulation was inhibiting rail profitability and that the industry needed much
greater pricing and operating freedom to avoid more bankruptcies.” Id. at 41–42.
Therefore, Congress began its attempt to deregulate the railroad industry. Id. at 42.
Deregulation increased the railroads’ freedom to operate, stimulated competition, and
benefited both consumers and the railroad industry. Id. at 43–45. As of 1998, operating
costs per ton-mile “were 60 percent lower than when deregulation began.” Id. at 43; see also
Barnum, supra note 26 (discussing how too much economic regulation can lead to
bankruptcy). “[O]ne of the main reasons that the Penn Central and the Erie and the others
had gone bankrupt was because there had been too much railroad too little utilized, and
that there had been too much railroad because there had been too much public-utility-type
economic regulation of the railroads.” Id. The bankruptcies that resulted from regulating
the railroad industry aided in the decision to deregulate the airlines before they followed
the trend of the railroads. Id.
29
AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 30; see Airline Deregulation Act of
1978: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 98th Cong. (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearings] (statement of Frank Willis,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, Department of
Transportation) (explaining the concept of deregulation). “[D]eregulation is all about
businessmen exploring the marketplace finding out what works and having the flexibility
to create or modify operations as the marketplace dictates.” Id. See generally Barnum, supra
note 26 (discussing seven factors that prompted airline deregulation). The first factor was
airline pricing. Id. The cost of airline tickets was increasing, and the airlines lacked the
ability to change fares because they were regulated similar to that of public utilities. Id.
The second and third factors were the CAB’s regulation of who entered the airline business
and what routes an airline could fly. Id. The fourth factor was the issue of significant
delays imposed by the CAB. Id. The CAB frequently sat on applications from airlines who
applied for entry or a new route. Id. The fifth factor was that the CAB approved capacity
limitation agreements and immunized airlines from antitrust attacks. Id. The sixth factor
was the fact that planes were flying only half full even though “most travelers would
prefer to fly on fuller planes in order to pay less.” Id. Furthermore, intrastate carriers that
were not regulated by the CAB showed the public that it was possible to achieve

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss1/7

Patrick: Airline Employees Are Not Reporting Violations Because They Lack

2011]

Ready for Takeoff?

217

forces” would best benefit the airline industry by advancing efficiency,
innovation, low prices, and the quality of services. 30 Consequently, the
ADA was signed into law on October 24, 1978; its main purpose was “to
remove government control over fares, routes and market entry (of new
airlines) from commercial aviation.” 31 The regulatory powers of the CAB
were to be gradually diminished, allowing airline passengers to
experience market forces in the airline industry.32 The ADA would
satisfactory service while flying fuller planes. Id. The last factor that provoked
deregulation was “the well publicized success of a few intrastate carriers like PSA and
Southwest that were not regulated by the CAB and that were selling seats for much less
than their CAB-regulated competition.” Id.
30
124 CONG. REC. 30662 (1978); see Morales, 504 U.S. at 378 (discussing the congressional
intent behind the ADA).
31
AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 29. The goals of the ADA included:
[T]he maintenance of safety as the highest priority in air commerce;
placing maximum reliance on competition in providing air
transportation services; the encouragement of air service at major
urban areas through secondary or satellite airports; the avoidance of
unreasonable industry concentration which would tend to allow one
or more air carriers to unreasonably increase prices, reduce services, or
exclude competition; and the encouragement of entry into air
transportation markets by new air carriers, the encouragement of entry
into additional markets by existing air carriers, and the continued
strengthening of small air carriers.
Id. at 31; see 1983 Hearings, supra note 29 (statement of Frank Willis, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, Department of Transportation) (discussing
the elimination of government control in the industry and the desire to remain
deregulated). He stated:
[W]e believe that airline deregulation has given the public a broader
range of choices and services and prices, and it has expanded business
opportunities, promoted employment opportunities and stimulated
efficiency in the industry as a whole. We think there is a compelling
case for deregulation being made in the marketplace, and the best
evidence we can present for that is that there is no cry in the
commercial airline industry nor among its users for a return to
extensive Government control.
Id.
32
See AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 29 (discussing the diminishing
powers of the CAB); BAILEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 34 (explaining how the regulatory
authority of the CAB gradually diminished). The author explained:
The Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) proposed a gradual relaxation of
the CAB’s regulation of the industry, with full rate and route authority
to phase out over a four-year period. The Board’s authority over
routes was to end on December 31, 1981, and its authority over fares
on January 1, 1983. Its authority over domestic mergers, intercarrier
agreements, and interlocking directorates would transfer to the
Department of Justice on January 1, 1983. The Board would cease
operations entirely on January 1, 1985. The remaining tasks of
international negotiation and small community air service would shift
to the Department of Transportation on that date.
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stimulate open competition in the airline industry, encourage new
airlines to enter the market, allow service in small communities to
continue, and encourage the use of secondary airports in large cities. 33
Ultimately, the ADA eliminated heavy government-imposed
regulation and gave airlines the freedom to compete in the market. 34
Furthermore, the ADA enabled airlines to control their own ticket prices,
routes, and entry into the market, which allowed consumers to benefit
from lower prices.35
B. ADA’s Preemption Provision and Federal Preemption of State Law
In addition to deregulating the airlines, it was important to ensure
that state regulation did not interfere with the ADA’s objectives. 36
Therefore, Congress included an express preemption provision in the
ADA to prevent state regulation from adversely affecting the federal
deregulation process.37 However, Congress did not alter or repeal the
“saving clause” of the 1958 Act when it enacted this provision. 38

Id.; see also 1983 Hearings, supra note 29 (statement of Frank Willis, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, Department of Transportation) (discussing
the impact the ADA of 1978 had on the airline industry). The result of airline deregulation
“has been an increased competitive environment with positive effects on service, efficiency,
and fares.” Id.
33
MILLER, supra note 22, at 11; see DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES, supra note 27,
at 1 (discussing the benefits of deregulation in the airline industry). According to
economists, a public policy is successful when its benefits outweigh its costs. Id. The
benefits of deregulating the airlines far exceed the costs. Id. Deregulating the airlines
“allow[ed] airlines to set their own fares and decide which markets to serve.” Id. On
average, the fares in the deregulated airline market “were immediately lower . . . than they
would have been had they continued to be regulated.” Id. Customers also benefited from
deregulation because it allowed the airlines to serve all markets. Id. at 2. Thus, travelers
did not have to make as many connections. Id. As a result, customers were not required to
change airlines as frequently. Id.
34
See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (explaining the effects of deregulation in
the airline industry).
35
See supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining how deregulation benefitted the
airline industry).
36
See supra Part II.A (explaining the purpose of the ADA and its objectives).
37
Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006); see Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378–79 (1992) (“To ensure that the States would not undo
federal deregulation with regulation of their own, the ADA included a pre-emption
provision, prohibiting the States from enforcing any law ‘relating to rates, routes, or
services’ of any carrier.”).
38
Morales, 504 U.S. at 378–79 (1992). The “‘saving clause’ [states] that ‘[n]othing . . . in
this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or
by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.” Id. at 378
(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1506); see Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Preemption by Airline
Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1), of State Law Labor-Related Claims, 41 A.L.R. FED.
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The ADA’s preemption provision prohibits states from “enact[ing]
or enforc[ing] . . . law[s], regulation[s], or other provision[s] having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air
carrier.”39 Unfortunately, the term “service” in the preemption clause is
vague and undefined, which has caused courts to adopt different
definitions of the term over the years.40 Some courts apply a broad
definition of service, extending the scope of the preemption clause to
include claims dealing with issues such as baggage handling and
boarding procedures.41 Other courts adopt a more narrow definition of

2D 215, § 3 (2009) (discussing the express savings clause that was retained in the ADA
despite the ADA’s preemption provision). The author discussed how:
Congress intended to occupy the field of regulation of airline services,
prices, and routes, but it did not intend to alter those remedies existing
under the common law in other fields pertaining to airlines. . . . The
existence of a savings clause does not alone, however, allow the
creation of federal common law in the absence of congressional intent
to fashion such a remedy. Further, this general remedies savings
clause may not undermine the effect of the ADA’s express preemption
provision and therefore does not shelter state actions from preemption.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
39
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1); cf. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 223 n.1 (1995)
(explaining how this title of the United States Code was reenacted in 1994). Congress
revised this clause and changed the wording, but Congress intended no substantive change
to be made. Id.
40
See Eric E. Murphy, Federal Preemption of State Law Relating to an Air Carrier’s Services,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1202–17 (2004) [hereinafter Air Carrier’s Services] (presenting the
different definitions of “services” that have been adopted by courts). The Supreme Court
has never interpreted the term “services” in the preemption provision. Id. at 1202. Courts
have adopted very different definitions of the term “service” that range between a broad
definition, which is the most preemptive, and a narrow definition, which is the least
preemptive. Id. at 1202–03. The broad definition of “services” interprets the term as
including all matters in “the contractual arrangement between the airline and the user of
the service.” Id. at 1203 (quoting Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir.
1995)). Examples of items that would be included would be “ticketing, boarding
procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the
transportation itself.” Id. (quoting Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336). This definition has “broad
preemptive effect.” Id. Some courts use this definition in a more limited manner by giving
it exceptions, such as “distinguishing between a service and the operation of the plane and
between economic and safety services.” Id. at 1205. Other courts apply the narrow
definition of “services,” which interprets the term as meaning air services. Id. at 1206. The
narrow definition includes things related to actual air transportation and scheduling,
limiting the scope of preemption. Id.
41
See Arapahoe Cnty. Pub. Airport Auth. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 242 F.3d 1213, 1222
(10th Cir. 2001) (accepting the broad definition of “services” adopted by Hodges); Smith v.
Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 1998) (adopting the broad definition established in
Hodges); Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1433
(7th Cir. 1996) (accepting the Fifth Circuit’s broad definition of “services”); Hodges, 44 F.3d
at 336 (defining services as having a broad definition). Hodges determined that:
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“service,” limiting the scope of preemption to claims actually related to
air transportation and scheduling.42
It is well established that Congress retains power to implement
preemption provisions pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, which
provides that states are bound by the laws of the United States. 43
Accordingly, federal law trumps state law when the two are in conflict
because the laws of the United States are “the [S]upreme Law of the
Land.”44 Preemption is important because it “allocat[es] governing
“Services” generally represent a bargained-for or anticipated provision
of labor from one party to another. If the element of bargain or
agreement is incorporated in our understanding of services, it leads to
a concern with the contractual arrangement between the airline and
the user of the service. Elements of the air carrier service bargain
include items such as ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food
and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the transportation
itself. These matters are all appurtenant and necessarily included with
the contract of carriage between the passenger or shipper and the
airline. It is these [contractual] features of air transportation that we
believe Congress intended to de-regulate as “services” and broadly to
protect from state regulation.
Id. (quoting Hodges, 44 F.3d at 354).
42
See Duncan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 208 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (accepting
the narrow definition of “services”). Services pertain to “‘the frequency and scheduling of
transportation, [or] the selection of markets to or from which transportation is provided.’”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259,
1265–66 (9th Cir. 1998)); Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265–66 (rejecting the broad definition of
services and replacing it with a narrow definition). Charas stated that:
Airlines’ “rates” and “routes” generally refer to the point-to-point
transport of passengers. “Rates” indicates price; “routes” refers to
courses of travel. It therefore follows that “service,” when juxtaposed
to “rates” and “routes,” refers to such things as the frequency and
scheduling of transportation, and to the selection of markets to or from
which transportation is provided (as in, “This airline provides service
from Tucson to New York twice a day.”) To interpret “service” more
broadly is to ignore the context of its use; and, it effectively would
result in the preemption of virtually everything an airline does. It
seems clear to us that that is not what Congress intended.
Id.
43
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states that “the Laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” Id.; see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1297 (defining
preemption as “[t]he principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can
supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation”).
44
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; see Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v.
Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass., 507 U.S. 218, 224 (1993) (“Consideration under
the Supremacy Cause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to
displace state law.” (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981))); Gade v.
Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (discussing when state law must
yield to federal law). “[A]ny State law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged
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authority between the federal and state governments.” 45 Federal
preemption of state law can occur one of two ways: (1) where federal
law expressly preempts state law; and (2) where preemption is implied
by a clear congressional intent to preempt state law.46 Express
preemption occurs when Congress explicitly states its command in the
statute’s language, such as with a preemption provision. 47 Implied
preemption occurs when the Congressional command is implicitly

power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.” Id. (quoting Felder
v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); De Canas v. Bica, 424
U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (explaining that state law must give way to federal law even when it
encompasses important state interests). “[E]ven state regulation designed to protect vital
state interests must give way to paramount federal legislation.” Id.
45
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 395 (3rd ed.
2006); see Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (discussing the importance of respecting
the States, even in areas that are heavily regulated such as the FDA).
46
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 393; see Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (explaining principles of
preemption). The Court explained:
Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and “is compelled
whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.” Absent
explicit preemptive language, we have recognized at least two types of
implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal
regulation is “‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’” and conflict
pre-emption, where “compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility,” or where state law “stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”
Id. (citations omitted); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)
(explaining that state law is preempted when it “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”); Gabriel F. Siegle,
Switching Tracks: Complete Preemption Removal and the Railway Labor Act, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
1107, 1121 (2007) (discussing complete preemption). The complete preemption doctrine
“permits the removal of claims from state court, pleaded in terms of state law, under a
limited set of circumstances.” Id. When the preemptive force of a statute is “so powerful as
to displace entirely any state cause of action,” then the “claim arises under federal law,
[and] falls within the removal jurisdiction of a federal court.” Id. There are only three
statutes that have been identified as having complete preemption: the Labor Management
Relations Act, Employment Retirement Income Security Act, and the National Bank Act.
Id.
47
Gade, 505 U.S. at 98; see Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)
(“The question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and we accordingly begin with the
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 396–401 (discussing express preemption).
“[E]ven if there is statutory language expressly preempting state law, Congress rarely is
clear about the scope of what is preempted . . . and this inevitably is an inquiry into
congressional intent.” Id. at 393.
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contained in its structure and purpose.48 Determining congressional
intent is necessary in both express and implied preemption. 49 Generally,
police powers of the states are not to be preempted unless there is a
“clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”50 There is a presumption
against preemption when historic police powers of the states are at issue
because states are respected by the Federal Government as “independent
sovereigns in our federal system, [which] leads us to assume that

Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. The Court looks at congressional intent to determine preemption.
Id.; see Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194–95 (2009) (discussing the foundation of preemption
jurisprudence). There are two main principles in our preemption jurisprudence. Id. at
1194–95. “First, ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption
case.’” Id. at 1194 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). The second
principle is “the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” Id. at 1194–95 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485) (internal quotation marks
omitted); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 393 (“[I]mplied preemption is often a function of
both perceived congressional intent and the language used in the statute or regulation.”).
49
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 393 (discussing congressional intent in express and
implied preemption). The Court must determine congressional intent in both express and
implied preemption. Id. The problem is that Congress almost never clearly or expressly
states its intent regarding the scope of preemption. Id. at 394. The Court is often left to
discern congressional intent by using “fragments of statutory language, random statements
in the legislative history, and the degree of detail of the federal regulation.” Id.
50
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Historic police powers of the
states are not to be preempted without a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id.
The Court explained:
Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme of
federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.
Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest
is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Likewise, the object
sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. Or the state
policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the
federal statute. It is often a perplexing question whether Congress has
precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory measures
has left the police power of the States undisturbed except as the state
and federal regulations collide.
Id. at 230–31 (citations omitted); see N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,
413 (1973) (observing that Congress should clearly state its intention regarding the
preemption of state laws). “The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be
presumed.” Id. (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202–03 (1952)); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1276 (defining police power). A police power is “[t]he
inherent and plenary power of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper to
preserve the public security, order, health, morality, and justice.” Id. States have a “Tenth
Amendment right . . . to establish and enforce laws protecting the public’s health, safety,
and general welfare, or to delegate this right to local governments.” Id.
48
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Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of action.” 51
Congress expressly exercised its Supremacy Clause power to implement
the ADA’s preemption provision and preempt state law from interfering
with the newly deregulated airline industry, but it was unclear regarding
its meaning of “service.”52
C. Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the ADA’s Preemption Provision
Two Supreme Court cases have interpreted the language of the
ADA’s express preemption provision. 53 The first case was Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., decided in 1992.54 The issue in Morales was
whether the states were preempted from enforcing their general
consumer protection statutes to prohibit allegedly deceptive airline fare
advertisements.55 The Court began its analysis by looking to the
language of the statute itself.56 As noted, the statute “expressly
preempt[ed] the states from ‘enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law, rule,
regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of
law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier . . . .’”57 The
See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1195 n.3 (quoting Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (discussing the presumption against preemption). Furthermore,
the Court stated that the presumption “accounts for the historic presence of state law,” and
it may apply in areas that are heavily regulated by the federal government. Id. Therefore,
the absence of federal regulation is not required for the presumption to apply. Id.
52
See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s power under the
Supremacy Clause); supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (explaining how courts have
adopted different definitions of “service”).
53
See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995) (interpreting the preemption
provision under the ADA and elaborating on the standards set forth in Morales); Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (interpreting the ADA’s preemption
provision for the first time).
54
504 U.S. 374 (1992).
55
Id. at 378. In 1987, the National Association of Attorneys General adopted Air Travel
Industry Enforcement Guidelines. Id. at 379. These guidelines contained specific standards
that governed “the content and format of airline advertising, the awarding of premiums to
regular customers (so-called ‘frequent flyers’), and the payment of compensation to
passengers who voluntarily yield their seats on overbooked flights.” Id. These guidelines
did not attempt to create new laws or regulations in the airline industry. Id. Rather, they
explained “how existing state laws appl[ied] to air fare advertising and frequent flyer
programs.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The attorneys general of seven states
notified major airlines that they were in violation of the guidelines. Id. Airlines filed suit in
federal district court claiming that the state regulation of fare advertisements is preempted
by the ADA. Id at 380.
56
Morales, 504 U.S. at 383. The Court “[began] with the language employed by Congress
and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
57
Morales, 504 U.S. at 383 (alteration in original) (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1)).
The preemption provision was reenacted and reworded in 1994. Airline Deregulation Act,
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006). The current wording of the ADA preemption provision is
51
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Supreme Court focused on the phrase “relating to.” 58 The Court
determined that the ordinary meaning of “relating to” is broad;
therefore, the provision serves a broad preemptive purpose. 59
The Court analogized the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”) cases, where it had interpreted the “‘relates to’” an employee
benefit plan language as “‘if it has a connection with, or reference to,
such a plan.’”60 The Morales Court adopted this standard.61 As a result,
state laws, regulations, or other provisions are preempted if they have a
connection with or reference to airline “rates, routes, or services.” 62 The
Court further explained that certain state laws may not be preempted if
they affect the scope of the statute in “too tenuous, remote, or peripheral
a manner.”63
The Supreme Court also applied ERISA precedent to reach its
holding that the ADA preemption provision preempts both state laws
the following: a state “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that
may provide air transportation under this subpart.” § 41713(b)(1); see Wolens, 513 U.S. at
223 n.1 (explaining that no substantive changes were intended by Congress when it revised
the preemption provision).
58
See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383 (“[T]he key phrase, obviously, is ‘relating to.’”).
59
Id. at 383–84. The Court explained that “[t]he ordinary meaning of these words is a
broad one . . . and the words thus express a broad pre-emptive purpose.” Id. at 383.
“‘[R]elating to’ [means] . . . ‘to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to
pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.’” Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979)).
60
Morales, 504 U.S. at 384. The ERISA preemption clause stated that all state laws are
superseded “insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); see Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983)
(“The breadth of [the provision’s] pre-emptive reach is apparent from [its] language.”).
The Court defined “relates to” in ERISA’s preemption provision as “ha[ving] a connection
with or reference to such a plan.” Id. at 96–97; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (stating that ERISA’s preemption provision is “deliberately expansive,
and designed to ‘establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern’”).
61
Morales, 504 U.S. at 384. The language in the ADA’s preemption provision was
identical to the language in ERISA’s preemption provision. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(showing the similarly worded preemption provision of ERISA).
62
Morales, 504 U.S. at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Since the relevant
language of the ADA is identical, we think it appropriate to adopt the same standard here:
State enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to airline ‘rates, routes, or
services’ are pre-empted under 49 U.S.C.App [sic] § 1305(a)(1).” Id.
63
Id. at 390. Examples of laws that would be “far more tenuous” than the law addressed
in Morales are state laws concerning “nonprice aspects of fare advertising.” Id. The Court
stated that the “saving clause” does not adversely affect the preemption provision because
it is merely a relic of the pre-ADA era that lacked a preemption provision. Id. at 384–85. In
statutory construction, the specific governs the general; therefore, a general saving clause
protecting state remedies cannot be allowed to trump a specific substantive preemption
provision. Id. “[W]e do not believe Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn
statute through a general saving clause.” Id. at 385 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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specifically addressed to the airline industry and laws of general
applicability that may have an indirect effect.64 Additionally, the Court
held that the ADA’s preemption provision preempted all state laws that
fall within its scope, including state laws that are consistent with the
provision.65 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the fare advertising
provisions in Morales were preempted by the ADA.66
In the second case, American Airlines v. Wolens, the Supreme Court
interpreted “relating to rates, routes, or services” as meaning states
cannot impose their own public policies, regulation, or competition
theories on airline operations.67 In Wolens, the airline modified the terms
and conditions of its frequent flyer program and applied it
retroactively.68 Customers who earned credits prior to the modification
of the frequent flyer program were disadvantaged because their credits

See id. at 386 (explaining the petitioner’s argument against preemption). The
petitioner argued that laws of general applicability were not preempted by the ADA. Id.
The only laws preempted were state laws specifically tailored to the airline industry. Id.
The Court disagreed with this notion; it completely ignored the broad “relating to”
language. Id. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that they “have consistently rejected this
precise argument in [their] ERISA cases: ‘[A] state law may ‘relate to’ a benefit plan, and
thereby be pre-empted, even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans, or
the effect is only indirect.’” Id.
65
See id. at 387 (addressing the argument that state laws should not be preempted when
they are consistent with federal law). The statute’s language does not suggest that its
preemption is limited to inconsistent state regulation. Id.
66
Id. at 391. The Court explained that state restrictions on fare advertising have a direct
effect on airline fares. Id. at 388. Advertising informs the public of prices and services,
thereby performing a role in the allocation of resources. Id. State restrictions on
advertising increases the difficulty of finding the lowest cost seller and thus reduces the
incentive to price competitively. Id.; see Ill. Corporate Travel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d
751, 754 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that “[p]rice advertising surely ‘relates to’ price,” as stated
by Judge Easterbrook).
67
513 U.S. 219, 229 n.5 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Wolens Court also
interpreted other terms and phrases from the preemption provision such as “‘enforce,’”
“‘enact,’” and “‘having the force and effect of law.’” Id. The Court stated that the words
“‘enforce”” and “‘enact’” “‘could [ ] be read to preempt even state-court enforcement of
private contracts.’” Id. However, the phrase “‘law, rule, regulation, standard, or other
provision’” indicates “‘official, government-imposed policies, not the terms of a private
contract.’” Id. The Court further explained that the phrase “‘having the force and effect of
law’” is most naturally read to “‘refe[r] to binding standards of conduct that operate
irrespective of any private agreement.’” Id.
68
Id. at 225. Plaintiffs participated in Amercian Airlines’ frequent flyer program called
AAdvantage, which gave participants an opportunity to earn mileage credits when they
flew American. Id. at 224. The mileage credits could be exchanged for airline tickets or
class upgrades. Id. American made modifications to the AAdvantage program and
applied them retroactively. Id. at 225.
64
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were devalued.69 The Court held that the state consumer fraud act claim
was preempted, but the state law breach of contract claim was not. 70 The
Court determined that the purpose of the ADA was to leave the selection
and design of marketing mechanisms to the airline industry and not to
the states.71 Therefore, the consumer fraud claim, which related to
“rates” and affected the airlines’ marketing scheme, was preempted by
the ADA’s preemption clause.72 In regards to the state law breach of
contract claim, the Court explained that the ADA’s preemption clause,
when read with the “savings clause,” allowed states to afford relief to a
party who claimed and proved that an airline dishonored a term that it
stipulated.73
Ultimately, Morales and Wolens established the test for determining
preemption under the ADA.74 A state law is preempted by the ADA’s
preemption provision if it “relates to airline rates, routes, or services,
either by expressly referring to them or by having a significant economic
effect upon them.”75

Id. at 224–25. Plaintiffs brought suit against the airline claiming that the cutbacks
violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted
a breach of contract. Id. at 225.
70
Id. at 222. The remedy sought for the breach of contract claim merely holds the parties
to their agreement. Id. at 229. Furthermore, holding that the ADA permits state law breach
of contract claims “makes sense of Congress’ retention of the FAA’s saving clause.” Id. at
232.
71
Id. at 228.
72
Id. States are stopped from “imposing their own substantive standards with respect to
rates, routes, or services.” Id. at 232.
73
Id. at 232–33. The Court did “not read the ADA’s preemption clause . . . to shelter
airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery
solely for the airline’s alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.” Id. at 228.
The terms and conditions offered by airlines, and accepted by passengers, are “privately
ordered obligations ‘and thus do not amount to a State’s enact[ment] or enforce[ment] [of]
any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law
within the meaning of [the ADA’s preemption provision].’” Id. at 228–29 (alteration in
original).
74
See supra notes 54–66 and accompanying text (explaining how Morales established the
test to determine preemption under the ADA); supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text
(illustrating how Wolens applied the Morales test); see also Wolens, 513 U.S. at 234–35
(explaining that the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision is too complicated to be
settled by two Supreme Court cases). “[W]hile we adhere to our holding in Morales, we do
not overlook that in our system of adjudication, principles seldom can be settled ‘on the
basis of one or two cases . . . .’” Id.
75
Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 (7th
Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (clearly stating the test established by the
Supreme Court in Morales and Wolens).
69
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D. The WPP
After the Supreme Court interpreted the ADA’s preemption
provision, the enactment of the WPP complicated the analysis. 76 For
many years, the aviation industry lacked a federal whistleblower statute
to protect airline employees.77 In 2000, Congress enacted the Wendell H.
Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR
21”) to improve airline safety.78 AIR 21 included a federal whistleblower
protection program providing uniform whistleblower protection to
airline employees for the first time. 79 Thus, the ADA was amended to
See supra Part II.A–C (explaining the purpose behind the ADA and its preemption
provision and discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA’s preemption
provision).
77
See Peter R. Marksteiner, The Flying Whistleblower: It’s Time for Federal Statutory
Protection for Aviation Industry Workers, 25 J. LEGIS. 39, 39 (1999) (discussing the need for a
federal whistleblower statute). Employees in the aviation industry were not completely
unprotected from whistleblower retaliation; however, they did not enjoy a federal
whistleblower statute. Id. A federal whistleblower statute was necessary to encourage
airline employees to report violations without fear of retaliation. Id. The FAA is in charge
of monitoring and enforcing safety standards in the aviation industry. Id. at 40. Since the
demand for regional and commuter airlines has catapulted, “[t]he FAA has turned to the
carriers themselves to monitor their own compliance with FAA standards under what is
referred to as the ‘Safety Partnership’ program.” Id. at 39. Like other agencies, the FAA
has limited resources and a fixed budget. Id. at 40. Airline employees are in the best
situation to discover and report safety violations. Id. at 39. However, without federal
statutory protection for aviation whistleblowers, employees in the airline industry will not
come forward with violations due to fear of reprisal. Id. at 73; Rita Murphy, OSHA, AIR21
and Whistleblower Protection for Aviation Workers, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 901, 910 (2004)
[hereinafter OHSA, AIR 21 and Whistleblower Protection] (“Congress began seriously
contemplating a whistleblower protection program in the late 1990s after a string of
commercial passenger plane crashes pushed safety concerns to the forefront.”).
78
Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2006); see AVIATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 203 (discussing the enactment of AIR21); Marksteiner,
supra note 77, at 50 (discussing the relationship between airline safety and statutory
whistleblower protection). The author explained that if people felt free to report violations
without fear of reprisal, the violations would be corrected and the safety risks would be
eliminated. Id.
79
49 U.S.C. § 42121; see 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (explaining that the objective of the
WPP was to provide whistleblower protection to airline employees to encourage violation
reporting and ensure safety); AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 206;
Marksteiner, supra note 77, at 52 (discussing how “[t]he FAA relies on voluntary reporting
by airline employees to compile and track much of the data it needs in order to perform its
safety function”). The author stated:
[R]eliance on front-line employees to report violations of laws or rules
is an indispensable asset to regulatory agencies whose ability to
regulate effectively is limited by finite resources. The benefits from
those front-line employees are potentially lost if they must choose
between reporting essential information to the FAA and the possibility
of losing their jobs. . . . Workers need the protections offered by this
76
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include the WPP.80 The WPP provided a federal cause of action for
employees that protected them from retaliatory termination or
discrimination for reporting violations or alleged violations to the FAA
or the company itself.81 The WPP did not include an express preemption
provision, did not reference preemption in any way, and did not indicate
that it was an expansion of the preemption clause in the ADA. 82
Under the WPP, an employee may not directly file a civil action in
federal court against his employer. 83 Pursuant to the statute, an
employee is required to go through an administrative complaint and
investigation process with the DOL.84 First, he must file a complaint
with the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”).85 Then, the Secretary assesses
law if they are expected to act as an extension of the FAA’s safety
inspection component.
Id. at 53–54.
80
49 U.S.C. § 42121; see Buckman, supra note 38, § 2 (discussing the history of the ADA
and the WPP).
81
49 U.S.C. § 42121; see Marksteiner, supra note 77, at 51 (explaining the important role
airline employees play in reporting safety violations to the FAA and the need to protect
these employees from retaliation). The author explained:
[I]n the aviation industry, the FAA recognizes that employee
participation is essential to implement the FAA policy of insuring that
air travel is as safe as possible for the traveling public. . . . [T]he FAA
will not be adequately able to enforce its safety policy unless the
workers upon whom the FAA relies are confident they can report
violations without fear of reprisal.
Id.
82
49 U.S.C. § 42121; see Buckman, supra note 38, § 2 (stating that the WPP “contains no
reference to preemption and no indication that it altered or added anything to the ADA’s
preemption provisions”).
83
49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(1). The complaint procedure under the WPP states that “[a]
person who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against
by any person in violation of [49 § 42121(a)] may . . . file (or have any person file on his or
her behalf) a complaint with the Secretary . . . .” Id.
84
Id. § 42121(b). A person who believes that he has been retaliated against in violation
of the WPP may file a complaint with the Secretary “not later than 90 days after the date on
which such violation occurr[ed].” Id. § 42121(b)(1); see Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc.,
342 F.3d 1248, 1261 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining the process of going through the DOL
under the WPP); AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 206 (“The time limit for
employees to make such complaints in writing to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration is 90 days from the date of each adverse employment action.”).
85
49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(1). Upon receiving the complaint, the Secretary will “notify, in
writing, the person named in the complaint and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration of the filing of the complaint, of the allegations contained in the complaint,
of the substance of evidence supporting the complaint, and of the opportunities that will be
afforded to such person.” Id. The Secretary shall afford the person named in the complaint
an opportunity to submit a written response to the complaint and an opportunity to meet
with a representative of the Secretary to present statements from witnesses. Id.
§ 42121(b)(2)(A); see supra notes 83–85 and infra notes 86–88 (discussing the procedures
under the WPP).
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the merits of the employee’s complaint and either denies it or finds it
meritorious.86 If the Secretary finds that the employee was terminated or
discharged for reporting a violation or an alleged violation, an
abatement of the violation can be ordered, and the employee may be
reinstated and awarded back pay and compensatory damages. 87 Either
party may obtain review of the Secretary’s order in the circuit court of
appeals if he is unsatisfied with the outcome.88
AIR 21’s WPP is one of seventeen whistleblower statutes that the
DOL is responsible for.89 The limited number of resources, increasing
caseload, and the statute’s complexity has resulted in lengthy delays in

49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(A). Within 60 days of receiving the complaint and allowing
the employer to answer, “the [Secretary] shall conduct an investigation and determine
whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the complaint has merit.” Id. The
Secretary shall “notify, in writing, the complainant and the person alleged to have
committed a violation of subsection (a) of the Secretary’s findings. Id. “If the [Secretary]
concludes that there is a reasonable cause to believe that a violation of [49 § 42121(a)] has
occurred, the Secretary shall accompany the Secretary’s findings with a preliminary order
providing the relief.” Id. “The [Secretary] shall dismiss a complaint . . . and shall not
conduct an investigation . . . unless the complainant makes a prima facie showing that any
behavior described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a) was a contributing factor
in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint.” Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i). The
Secretary may not order relief “if the employer demonstrates, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in
the absence of that behavior.” Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii).
87
49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(3)(B). The statute states:
If, in response to a complaint filed under paragraph (1), the [Secretary]
determines that a violation of subsection (a) has occurred, the
[Secretary] shall order the person who committed such violation to—
(i) take affirmative action to abate the violation;
(ii) reinstate the complainant to his or her former position together
with the compensation (including back pay) and restore the terms,
conditions, and privileges associated with his or her employment; and
(iii) provide compensatory damages to the complainant.
Id.
88
Id. § 42121(b)(4)(A). The statute further states:
Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order issued under
[the WPP] may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which the violation, with respect to which the
order was issued, allegedly occurred or the circuit in which the
complainant resided on the date of such violation. The petition for
review must be filed not later than 60 days after the date of the
issuance of the final order of the [Secretary].
Id.
89
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-106, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
PROGRAM: BETTER DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT WOULD HELP ENSURE PROGRAM
QUALITY AND CONSISTENCY 1, 7 (2009) (explaining the several whistleblower statutes that
the DOL is responsible for).
86
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the investigation process.90
Generally, investigations exceed the
statutory time frame allowed for the investigation. 91 In addition to
lengthy investigations, the employees are only successful in a minority of
the cases.92 For example, employees had successful outcomes in about
nineteen percent of the 1,800 cases in 2007.93 Appeals are also delayed
and relatively unsuccessful; about one-third or fewer of the appeals
result in outcomes that favor the employee.94
Thus, AIR 21 established the WPP, which provided airline
employees with the option of bringing a federal whistleblower claim
against their employer for retaliatory discharge. 95 Subsequently, airline
employees had uniform federal whistleblower protection; however, the
process was delayed and employees were successful in a minority of the
cases.96
E. The Circuit Split
Prior to enactment of the WPP, airline employees could only bring
state whistleblower claims.97 Several airline employees brought state
See id. at 2, 4. OSHA has about sixty-nine investigators, eight supervisory
investigators, and one program manager assigned to enforcing seventeen whistleblower
statutes, and there are roughly 1,800 whistleblower complaints that they must investigate.
Id. at 2. In addition, “caseloads are increasing at all levels.” Id. at 3. “[D]ue to the addition
of several new statutes, investigators are carrying larger, more complex caseloads.” Id. at 6.
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) “found that completion of any one phase
of an investigation—opening, information gathering, or closing—sometimes took longer
than the overall statutory or regulatory time frame for the entire investigation.” Id. at 4.
Complexity of the cases affects the length of the investigation process. Id. Many
investigators reported that “they lack some of the resources they need to do their jobs,
including equipment, training, and legal assistance.” Id. at 5. For instance, almost half of
the investigators in the government’s survey stated that AIR21’s WPP was one of the most
complex statutes to enforce, and they did not receive any specific training for this statute.
Id. at 6.
91
See id. at 17. The GAO found that investigations for whistleblower statutes that have a
sixty-day time frame could take up to 320 days to complete. Id. The WPP has a statutory
time frame of sixty days. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(A).
92
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 89, at 26 (explaining the small
percentage of outcomes that favor the employee).
93
See id. (following necessary adjustments, GAO found that sixty-five percent of the
whistleblower complaints were dismissed, seventeen percent withdrawn, and nineteen
percent found to have merit).
94
See id. at 5.
95
See supra Part II.D (introducing the federal remedy enacted for airline employees who
blow the whistle).
96
See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing the delays with the
investigation process and low success rates).
97
See Marksteiner, supra note 77, at 39 (discussing the need for a federal whistleblower
statute). At the time of this article, most employees enjoyed some form of federal
whistleblower protection, but not airline employees. Id.; see also OHSA, AIR 21 and
90
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retaliatory discharge claims against their employers after the ADA’s
preemption provision was in place, but before enactment of the WPP. 98
Notably, a majority of the courts found that these claims were not
preempted by the ADA.99 The courts applied the Morales test, which
questioned whether the law related to “rates, routes, or services of an air
carrier.”100 Most courts have held that state whistleblower claims were
Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 910 (discussing how the airline industry was
opposed to federal statutory protection). Many people in the airline industry believed that
airline employees had adequate recourse and federal statutory protection was not
necessary. Id. Furthermore, most airlines believed the FAA was successfully monitoring
safety and a whistleblower protection program for airline employees was “intrusive and
unnecessary.” Id.
98
See Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 598 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that
Congress did not clearly intend the ADA’s preemption provision to preempt state law
claims for retaliation); Espinosa v. Cont’l Airlines, 80 F. Supp. 2d 297, 302 (D.N.J. 2000) (“It
cannot be stated that Congress clearly intended for a plaintiff’s state law claim for
retaliatory discharge to be preempted by the [ADA].”); Ruggiero v. AMR, Corp., No. C9420160JW, 1995 WL 549010, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1995) (“It is not reasonable to believe
that retaliatory discharge claims have a ‘connection with or reference to’ air carrier
services.”). Any effect they may have on services “is far ‘too tenuous, remote or peripheral’
to have pre-emptive effect.” Id.; see also Anderson v. Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc., 886 P.2d
1068, 1071 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the relationship between the aircraft mechanic’s
wrongful discharge claim and “services” was “‘too tenuous, remote, or peripheral’” to be
preempted by the ADA).
99
See Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing
various cases that held the preemption clause of the ADA did not include retaliatory
discharge claims); Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 597 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that any effect the retaliatory discharge claim may have on American Airline’s services was
“far too remote to trigger pre-emption” and thus was not preempted by the ADA);
Espinosa, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (holding that the state whistleblower claim was “‘too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral’” to be preempted by the ADA). “Although the Court’s
holding in Morales appeared to suggest a broad interpretation of the ‘related to’ phrase, the
Court also cautioned that the ADA’s preemptive sweep was not unlimited and did not
preempt state actions that were ‘too tenuous, remote, or peripheral.’” Id.; see also Ruggiero,
1995 WL 549010, at *9 (holding that the ADA does not preempt a claim for retaliatory
discharge), Anderson v. Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc., 886 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Or. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that the aircraft mechanic’s wrongful discharge claim was not preempted by
the ADA). But see Marlow v. AMR Servs. Corp., 870 F. Supp. 295, 299 (D. Haw. 1994)
(holding that the aircraft mechanic’s state whistleblower claim was preempted by the
ADA).
100
See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (establishing the test
for determining whether a state claim is preempted by the ADA); Air Carrier’s Services,
supra note 40, at 1197–98 (explaining the different interpretations courts have adopted
regarding the term “service” in the ADA preemption provision). Courts have not been
able to derive a uniform definition of the term “service” under the ADA. Id. at 1198. For
example:
One interpretation is that ‘service’ means air services, involving only
actual transportation and its frequency and scheduling. If the term is
given this narrow definition, express preemption can never occur with
regard to the other various services the airlines provide. In contrast,
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“too tenuous, remote, or peripheral” and thus fell outside the scope of
preemption.101
Subsequent to enactment of the WPP, airline employees continued to
pursue state remedies.102 The circuits took opposing views as to whether
the WPP preempted state whistleblower claims: (1) the Eighth Circuit
held that the WPP expressly preempted state whistleblower claims by
expanding the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision; and (2) the
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits held that the WPP did not expand
the preemption provision’s scope, thus the only analysis was whether
the claim fell within the scope of the ADA’s preemption clause. 103

“service” can also include airline services beyond transportation, such
as flight attendant services, overhead compartment storage, and
boarding procedures. If the term is given this broad definition, the
statute can preempt all of these other areas if the state regulations have
the requisite connection to them.
Id. at 1197–98 (footnotes omitted).
101
See supra notes 98–99 (illustrating the numerous cases that have held retaliatory
discharge claims do not fall within the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision); see also
Katrina Maher, Note, Preemption—The Preemptive Scope of the Airline Deregulation Act as
Amended by the Whistleblower Protection Program: Wright v. Nordam Group, Inc., 74 J. AIR L.
& COM. 113, 118–19 (2009) (explaining that Congress must have been aware that the
majority of courts held that state law whistleblower claims were not preempted by the
ADA before the enactment of the WPP).
102
See Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower
Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 621 (1999) (explaining why employees prefer to bring
state whistleblower claims, even after a federal remedy is available). Most state
whistleblower statutes rely on judicial redress as opposed to an administrative process;
thus, employees who wish to have their day in court bring state remedies. Id.
103
See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (following the
Branche view); Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 189–90 (3d Cir. 2005) (following the
Branche court’s reasoning); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64 (holding that the WPP’s
preemption clause is not altered or expanded by the WPP); see also Maher, supra note 101, at
114 (discussing the new issue of whether the WPP expands the scope of the ADA’s
preemption provision). The author discussed:
[F]or the first twenty-two years following passage of the ADA, if a
state law whistleblower claim was not related to the services of an
airline, the claim was not expressly preempted by [the ADA].
However, when Congress enacted the WPP and created a federal
whistleblower cause of action, the courts were forced to address the
issue of whether Congress intended to expand the preemptive scope of
[the ADA] such that all state law whistleblower claims falling within
the WPP’s scope are preempted.
Id. (footnotes omitted); cf. Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 498 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding
that the WPP expands the scope of the WPP’s preemption provision).
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Eighth Circuit’s Position: The WPP Expanded the Scope of the
ADA’s Preemption Provision

In Botz v. Omni Air International in 2002, the Eighth Circuit, in a case
of first impression, held that the ADA, as amended by the federal WPP,
expressly preempted the flight attendant’s claim under the state
whistleblower statute.104 The court began its analysis by assessing the
purpose of Congress and the ordinary meaning of the statutory
language.105
First, the court determined whether the scope of the preemption
clause encompassed the flight attendant’s claim. 106 The court applied the
test from Morales; thus, Botz’s state whistleblower claim was preempted
by the ADA if it had “a connection with or reference to airline ‘rates,
routes, or services.’”107 The court held that the Minnesota whistleblower
statute fell within the scope of the preemption provision because it
indirectly affected “services.”108

Botz, 286 F.3d at 498. “While the plain language of the ADA’s pre-emption provision
encompasses Botz’s claims, the WPP makes it unmistakable that such claims are preempted and dispels whatever doubt might possibly linger after a plain-language analysis
of the ADA’s pre-emption provision.” Id. In Botz, a flight attendant refused a flight
assignment that was round-trip from Alaska to Japan because she believed it violated the
Federal Aviation Regulations (“FARs”). Id. at 490. Omni allegedly terminated her in
retaliation of her refusal. Id. Botz brought a claim under the Minnesota whistleblower
statute, and the case was removed to the federal court. Id. at 490–91. The Botz court had to
determine whether the flight attendant’s state whistleblower claim was preempted by the
ADA and whether the WPP expanded the preemption clause of the ADA. Id. at 491.
105
Id. at 491–92. Preemption is not taken lightly in the employment law area because it
“‘falls within the traditional police power of the State.’” Id. at 493. However, where
Congress has given a clear intent for preemption, the state’s police powers may be
superseded. Id.
106
Id. at 491–92. Theories of implied preemption are usually not considered when
Congress has placed an express preemption clause in the enacted legislation. Id. at 493.
107
See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (establishing the test
for determining what is preempted by the ADA’s preemption clause). State enforcement
actions having “a connection with, or reference to airline ‘rates, routes, or services’” are
expressly preempted by the ADA. Id.; see also Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219,
228 n.5 (1995) (discussing the Morales test). The Wolens court stated that this “is most
sensibly read, in light of the ADA’s overarching deregulatory purpose, to mean ‘States may
not seek to impose their own public policies or theories of competition or regulation on the
operations of an air carrier.’” Id.
108
Botz, 286 F.3d at 492, 496–97. Botz argued that her claims are protected from
preemption by the saving clause in the ADA; however, the court disagreed and found the
saving clause to be merely a general remedies clause that “is a relic of the pre-ADA/no
pre-emption regime.” Id. at 491 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 385). Furthermore, the
Morales Court already held that the general saving clause cannot undermine the effect of
the express, specific preemption clause. Morales, 504 U.S. at 385.
104
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Botz relied on cases decided prior to the WPP, when there was no
equivalent federal cause of action available.109 The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the WPP provided protection to airline employees who
were discriminated against or discharged for reporting safety-related
violations, which evidenced that Congress had a “clear and manifest
intent to [preempt state law] whistleblower claims related to air
safety.”110 Thus, the enactment of the WPP and the protections it
provides airline employees encompasses “the types of claims [that]
Congress intended the ADA to [preempt].” 111 Congress created a single,
uniform standard to deal with air-safety violation complaints and
furthered its goal of market force reliance by not allowing such
complaints to be determined by fragmented, inconsistent state
regulation.112
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Congress was aware of the ADA,
its express preemption provision, and its broad application. 113 Further,
109
Botz, 286 F.3d at 496, 496 n.8. Botz further argued that her claims were too tenuously
and remotely connected to “prices, routes, or services” to be preempted. Id. at 496. Botz
relied on a number of cases that “held certain [state law] employment discrimination
claims to be too remote or tenuously related to air-carrier prices, routes, and services to be
pre-empted.” Id. (footnote omitted). The court found the cases it relied on to be
distinguishable because they did not involve a state law that gave an airline employee the
right to refuse an assignment essential to an airline’s “services,” and none of them involved
an application of state law that regulates the same principles as the WPP. Id.
110
Id.; see Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (explaining
“the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be
superseded . . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress” (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947) (explaining that there must be a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” for a
Federal Act to supersede traditional police powers of the states).
111
Botz, 286 F.3d at 497. By establishing a uniform remedy for aviation employees who
are retaliated against for reporting safety violations, Congress has “furthered its goal of
ensuring that the price, availability, and efficiency of air transportation rely primarily upon
market forces and competition.” Id.
112
Id. Furthermore, Congress provided a review system where an unsatisfied party can
appeal to the federal courts of appeals for review, making the process uniform across the
nation. Id.; cf. Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 373 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing
how safety is a necessity for airlines and not a factor when competing with other airlines).
“Safe operations . . . are a necessity for all airlines. Whether or not to conform to safety
standards is not an option for airlines in choosing a mode of competition.” Id.
113
Botz, 286 F.3d at 497. Botz argued that the WPP was not intended to preempt state
whistleblower statutes, because Congress did not include an express preemption provision
when it easily could have. Id. The Botz court thinks this argument “turns the proper logic
on its head.” Id. The court reasoned:
When it fashioned the WPP, Congress was surely aware of the ADA’s
express pre-emption provision. It was presumably aware, as well, that
the Supreme Court had determined that the provision had a broad
application and should be given an expansive interpretation. Given
this, we would expect Congress to have directed language in the WPP
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Congress was not mandated to include an express preemption provision
unless its intent was that the WPP did not preempt state whistleblower
claims.114 The court held that while Botz’s claim fell within the scope of
the “plain language” of the preemption provision—the WPP made it
“unmistakable that such claims are pre-empted and dispel[led] whatever
doubt might possibly linger after a plain-language analysis of the ADA’s
pre-emption provision.”115
2.

The Majority Position: The WPP Does Not Alter or Expand the
ADA’s Preemption Provision

Other circuits have refused to follow the Eighth Circuit’s
approach.116 In 2003, the Eleventh Circuit, in Branche v. Airtran Airways,
Inc., addressed the issue, declined to follow the Botz analysis, and
provided the opposing view for circuits to apply in the future.117
to the issue of federal pre-emption only if it had been Congress’s intent
that the WPP not exert any pre-emptive effect upon state
whistleblower provisions.
Id.
Id. But see Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that the silence as to preemption is “susceptible to more than one
interpretation”). In regards to the ADA’s preemption provision, the Supreme Court has
only interpreted “related to." Id. “[A]ir carrier services” has yet to be interpreted by the
Supreme Court. Id. Congress was aware of the judicial interpretations among the circuits
regarding “services,” and that most of the state retaliatory discharge claims were found not
to be preempted by the ADA. Id. Thus, “it becomes significantly less clear that in saying
nothing about pre-emption in the WPP Congress was somehow indicating that it assumed
state whistleblower claims to be pre-empted.” Id.
115
Botz, 286 F.3d at 498.
116
See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 2010) (following the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach); Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that the
Eleventh Circuit provided the better approach); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264 (holding that the
scope of the ADA is not expanded or altered by the WPP).
117
See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1261–64 (concluding that the ADA’s WPP does not expand the
scope of the ADA’s preemption provision). In Branche, an Airtran DC-9 airplane landed at
Tampa International Airport with one of its two engines running at a temperature
exceeding FAA guidelines; a dangerous situation that can result in engine failure. Id. at
1251. Airtran maintenance workers performed a test on the engine that they were
unqualified and unauthorized to do, violating the FARs. Id. at 1251–52. Branche, an
Airtran aircraft inspector, reported the violations to the FAA and was subsequently
terminated. Id. at 1252. Branche says that:
[A]fter the plane departed from [Tampa International Airport] on June
30, 2001, the engine overheated during its flight to Atlanta and the
plane subsequently was taken out of service. . . . [H]e alleges that the
following day he investigated this particular engine and learned that it
had overheated on two separate occasions during the preceding two
weeks.
Id.; see also Ventress, 603 F.3d at 693 (following the view set forth by the Eleventh Circuit);
Gary, 397 F.3d at 190 (applying the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis); AirTran Whistleblower Gets
114
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In Branche, the court divided its analysis into two steps.118 First, it
questioned whether Branche’s state claim related to “prices, routes or
services” of an air carrier resulting in preemption by the ADA. 119
Second, the court asked if the WPP expanded the scope of the ADA’s
preemption provision, thus preempting Branche’s state whistleblower
claim.120
In addressing the first issue, the Eleventh Circuit held that Branche’s
state whistleblower claim was unrelated to the “services” of an air carrier
and therefore not preempted.121 The court reasoned that his state
whistleblower claim was fundamentally an employment discrimination
claim that did not affect any area of airline competition. 122
As for the second issue, the court carefully analyzed the reasoning
set forth in Botz and held that the WPP does not require preemption of
Branche’s state whistleblower claim.123 The court reasoned that the
WPP’s silence as to preemption is ambiguous and could be read one of
two ways.124 One can follow the reasoning set forth in Botz, and argue
that Congress knew the preemption provision in the ADA was viewed
broadly and intended the WPP to expand its preemptive scope to
Day in Florida Court, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, Sept. 22, 2003 (stating that Branche wanted to
bring a state claim “under Florida law so that a jury could hear his case”).
118
See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1253–54, 1261 (applying the test set forth by the Supreme
Court in Morales, and then determining whether the WPP expands the scope of the ADA’s
preemption clause).
119
Id. at 1253–61. A state law is preempted by the ADA when it explicitly refers to airline
rates, routes, or services, or has a significant economic effect upon them. Id. at 1259; see
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (establishing the test to apply
when determining whether state law is preempted by the ADA).
120
Branche, 342 F.3d at 1261. The Branche court stated that preemption under the ADA is
mandatory when the state law has a connection with airline prices, routes, or services. Id.
at 1254. The court concluded that Branche’s state whistleblower claim did not expressly
refer to airline services; therefore, the only way it can be preempted is if it has a significant
economic effect on such services. Id. at 1255. The court did not share the broad view of the
term “services.” Id. at 1258. Furthermore, the Branche court explained that “to pre-empt
state law claims concerning other elements of airline operations that are not bargained for
plainly would not further the goal of promoting competition in the airline industry.” Id. at
1256. The Branche court concluded that “the phrase ‘related to the . . . services of an air
carrier’ means having a connection with or reference to the elements of air travel that are
bargained for.” Id. at 1258 (alteration in original).
121
Id. at 1261.
122
Id.; cf. Marksteiner, supra note 77, at 40 (addressing the argument made by the airline
industry that reporting safety violations relates to competition). “[T]he aviation industry
pleads its case by arguing that unnecessary or redundant safety measures will hurt
profitability and therefore not promote domestic air commerce. In its rule-making function,
the FAA ends up balancing the competing interests of safety and airline profitability.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
123
Branche, 342 F.3d at 1261–64.
124
Id. at 1263. The WPP does not state anything about preemption. Id.
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preempt state whistleblower claims.125 Conversely, one can argue that
Congress’ knowledge of the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision
“implies nothing about the legislature’s view of its scope.” 126 Congress
must have been aware that before enactment of the WPP, the majority of
courts found state whistleblower claims were not preempted by the
ADA.127 Therefore, by omitting a preemption clause in the WPP, it
appeared that Congress viewed state whistleblower claims as not
preempted.128
Furthermore, inferring that Congress intended to preempt all
equivalent state law claims with the enactment of the WPP would be
implying preemption, and implied preemption is inapplicable when the
statute includes an express preemption provision. 129 The Eleventh
Circuit held that the mere enactment of the WPP cannot justify
expanding the scope of the express preemption provision to include and
preempt all equivalent state whistleblower claims. 130 The court further
held that the Morales test should be applied when determining whether
state whistleblower laws are preempted by the ADA, as amended by the
WPP.131 Consequently, the only issue to determine is whether the state
whistleblower claim is related to airline “‘rates, routes, or services.’” 132
Subsequently, the Third and Ninth Circuits declined to follow the
Botz analysis and applied the Branche view.133 As a result, courts are
split—some follow the Botz analysis while others tend to follow the
Id.
Id. “Simply stated, it is possible to point to a multitude of substantive contexts in
which parallel state and federal remedies exist.” Id. at 1264; see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 496–97 (1996) (explaining that state remedies can exist beside federal remedies).
127
Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263.
128
Id. at 1263–64; see Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 111–12 (1992)
(explaining that the Court “will not infer pre-emption of the states’ historic police powers
absent a clear statement of intent by Congress”).
129
Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64; see Gade, 505 U.S. at 112 (stating “in express pre-emption
cases, that Congress’ intent must be divined from the language, structure, and purposes of
the statute as a whole”).
130
Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64; see Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v.
Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass., 507 U.S. 218, 224 (1993) (explaining that state
law should not be preempted unless it frustrates the federal scheme); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at
496–97 (discussing how federal and state remedies can coexist); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (discussing the principle that preemption should be judged
on whether or not the state standard frustrates the objectives of the federal law).
131
Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264; see supra Part II.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the ADA’s preemption clause and establishing the test to apply to
determine preemption under the ADA).
132
Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264.
133
See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the WPP
does not preempt state whistleblower claims); Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 189–90
(3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the WPP does not expand the ADA’s preemption provision).
125
126
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Branche analysis.134 The inconsistency in the application of the ADA’s
preemption provision regarding the WPP has resulted in inequality in
the relief sought by airline whistleblower employees.135 Some airline
employees have their state whistleblower claims heard, while others are
preempted.136 In addition, the federal remedy requires a delayed
investigation process with the DOL that results in a minority of
successful outcomes for employees.137 This can have an adverse effect on
the overall safety of the airline industry by suppressing future
whistleblower claims by airline employees. 138
If employees are
See Torikawa v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 08-00322, 2009 WL 2151821, at *4 (D. Haw.
July 17, 2009) (holding that the employee’s state whistleblower claim is not preempted by
the ADA or the WPP); Meyer v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 08 C 0599, 2009 WL 367762, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Feb 15, 2009) (holding that the WPP does not preempt “all state law retaliatory
discharge claims that relate to air safety”); Gervasio v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. 07-5530,
2008 WL 2938047, at *3 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008) (holding that the WPP does not preempt state
law whistleblower claims). The question remains the same: Is the state law related to rates,
routes, or services? Id.; James v. Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc., No. 07-CV-1640-HU, 2008
WL 2564804, at *5 (D. Or. June 23, 2008) (concluding that the wrongful discharge claim is
not preempted by the ADA, as amended by the WPP); Wright v. Nordam Grp., Inc., No.
07-CV-0699-CVE-PJC, 2008 WL 802986, at *3 (N.D. Okla. March 20, 2008) (holding that the
ADA, as amended by the WPP, preempts state whistleblower claims); Fadaie v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“The Court's conclusion that
plaintiffs’ retaliatory discharge claim is not ‘related to’ price, routes, or service is unaffected
by the existence of the WPP.”); Tucker v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.., 268 F. Supp. 2d
1360, 1363–64 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (stating that state whistleblower claims are preempted if they
fall under the ADA’s preemption clause); Simonds v. Pan Am. Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. 0311-M, 2003 WL 22251155, at *4–5 (D.N.H. Sept. 30, 2003) (stating that preemption of state
whistleblower claims should be determined on a case by case basis, and in this case the
claim was preempted by the ADA, as amended by the WPP).
135
See Ventress, 603 F.3d at 676, 683 (holding that the ADA’s preemption provision is
unaltered after the enactment of the WPP); Gary, 397 F.3d at 189–90 (holding that the WPP
does not expand the WPP’s preemption provision, therefore it does not preempt state
whistleblower claims); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64 (holding that the WPP’s preemption
clause is not altered or expanded by the WPP); Botz v. Omni Air Intern., 286 F.3d 488, 498
(8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the WPP expands the scope of the WPP’s preemption
provision).
136
See supra notes 134–35 (discussing the different holdings reached by circuit courts and
district courts concerning preemption of state whistleblower claims under the ADA, as
amended by the WPP).
137
See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing the lengthy administrative
process with the DOL and the small percentage of cases that result in favor of the
employee).
138
See Aviation Safety Protection Act of 1996: Hearings on H.R. 3187 Before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Comm., 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter
1996 Hearings] (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (noting that the threat of whistleblower
retaliation operates as an “unwritten company gag order”); OFFICE OF SYSTEM SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, A REPORT ON ISSUES RELATED TO PUBLIC INTEREST IN
AVIATION SAFETY DATA 16 (1997) (discussing the need for a strong fiduciary relationship
between the FAA and airline employees to ensure a high level of safety is maintained in the
134
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permitted to institute state actions against their employers for violating
state whistleblower statutes, they will not be as reluctant in reporting
safety violations and airline safety will not deteriorate. 139
III. ANALYSIS
The circuit split concerning whether the WPP preempts state
whistleblower claims must be resolved. 140 An airline employee should
have the option of bringing federal or state whistleblower claims against
his employer.141 Allowing airline employees to bring either claim
increases the amount of whistleblower protection, which will encourage
violation reporting in the future and ensure the highest level of aviation
safety.142 This Part will examine why the view adopted by the Eighth
Circuit is incorrect and hazardous to airline safety, and why the
opposing view—adopted by the Eleventh Circuit—is the correct
approach.143
First, Part III.A will discuss how the Eighth Circuit misinterpreted
the WPP by finding that it expands the scope of the ADA’s preemption
industry). A “high degree[ ] of trust between the FAA and its safety partners” is necessary
for the agency to carry out its safety mission as “its resources [are] increasingly constrained
as the industry becomes more complex.” Id. at 16; see also Marksteiner, supra note 77, at 50
(discussing the need for aviation employees to report safety violations to ensure the FAA’s
system is effective). “[I]f aviation workers cannot report safety violations without fear of
reprisal, they will not report these violations at all. Under these conditions, the selfreporting and self-correcting model will not work.” Id.; Mike M. Ahlers, Southwest settles
with FAA for $7.5 million, CNN (Mar. 2, 2009, 7:15 P.M.), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/
03/02/southwest.faa.settlement/index.html?iref=allsearch [hereinafter Ahlers, Southwest
settles with FAA] (“Southwest operated 46 of its Boeing 737 jets on nearly 60,000 flights
without performing mandatory inspections for fatigue cracks in their fuselages.”); FAA
proposes a $1.45 million fine against Northwest Airlines, CNN (Mar. 23, 2010, 1:11 P.M.),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/03/23/northwest.airlines.fine/index.html?iref=all
search (stating that “32 of the carrier’s 757s flew more than 90,000 passenger flights” while
in an unsafe condition”).
139
See 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining that
airline accidents could be prevented if safety violations are reported); OSHA, AIR21 and
Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 914 (explaining the benefits of increasing
whistleblower protection); see also Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin,
The State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100 (2000) (discussing how
whistleblower statutes have been enacted in each of the fifty states).
140
See supra notes 134–39 and accompanying text (explaining why the circuit split needs
to be resolved).
141
See infra Part III.A–C (explaining why federal and state remedies should be available
to airline whistleblowers).
142
See infra Part III.C (explaining that airline employees should have federal and state
remedies available to them because it will provide more protection and increase violation
reporting in aviation).
143
See infra Part III.A–C (analyzing the different approaches taken by the circuits and
explaining why the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is correct).
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provision and expressly preempts state whistleblower claims. 144 Next,
Part III.B will analyze congressional intent, as illustrated in the
legislative history of the statute, and how it further supports the Third,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ position that Congress did not intend the
WPP to expressly preempt similar state remedies. 145 Finally, Part III.C
will examine the detrimental effect the Eighth Circuit’s approach will
have on airline safety by suppressing violation reporting in the aviation
industry.146
A. The Eighth Circuit Misinterpreted the ADA as Amended by the WPP
This section will examine the flaws behind the Eighth Circuit’s
holding that the WPP preempted state law whistleblower claims.147 The
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is flawed in three respects. 148 First, the Eighth
Circuit casually inferred preemption even though it fell within
traditional police powers of the state and there was no express
preemption provision in the WPP. 149 Second, the Eighth Circuit
misinterpreted the goal of the ADA and the underlying objective behind
enacting the WPP.150 Third, the Eighth Circuit relied on the fairness and
uniformity of the WPP when, in reality, the WPP’s silence as to
preemption has resulted in unfair inconsistency among the circuits.151
First, the Eighth Circuit casually presumed preemption, even though
the statute fell within the traditional police powers of the state.152 Police
144
See infra Part III.A (discussing how the Eighth Circuit “lightly inferred” preemption,
misinterpreted the objectives of the ADA and the WPP, and erroneously relied on fairness
and uniformity).
145
See infra Part III.B (examining the WPP’s legislative history and how it supports the
Eleventh Circuit’s approach that the WPP does not preempt state whistleblower remedies).
146
See infra Part III.C (discussing how the Eighth Circuit’s approach will suppress future
violation reporting in the aviation industry, and the detrimental effect this will have on
airline safety).
147
See infra notes 148–96 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws behind the
reasoning used by the Eighth Circuit in support of its holding).
148
See infra notes 148–96 and accompanying text (analyzing the three problems with the
Eighth Circuit’s approach).
149
See infra notes 152–69 and accompanying text (discussing how the Eighth Circuit
casually presumed preemption when the statute involved a traditional police power of the
state).
150
See infra notes 170–82 and accompanying text (discussing how the Eighth Circuit
misinterpreted the objectives of the ADA and the WPP).
151
See infra notes 184–96 and accompanying text (explaining why the Eighth Circuit’s
reliance on fairness and uniformity of the WPP is contradicted).
152
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 234 (“[P]olice power allows state and local
governments to adopt any law that is not prohibited by the Constitution.”); see also
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (stating that states have historically
exercised their police powers to protect the safety of their citizens).
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powers of the states are not to be preempted unless there is a “clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.”153 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that state
whistleblower claims attempt to regulate the same area of the airline
industry as the WPP, which provides protection for airline employees,
and found that this was strong evidence of Congress’s “clear and
manifest intent” to preempt state whistleblower claims related to air
safety.154 However, merely enacting a federal remedy for airline
whistleblowers is not evidence of Congress’s “clear and manifest
purpose” to preempt all equivalent state remedies. 155
In support of this view, there is no express preemption provision in
the WPP.156 The express preemption provision of the ADA is in a
separate area of the statute, and it provides that state laws related to air
carrier “price[s], route[s], or service[s]” are preempted. 157 The Eighth
Circuit reasoned that Congress was aware of the ADA’s express
preemption provision and its broad interpretation, and that it would
have included non-preemption language in the WPP if it intended such a
result.158 However, Congress just as easily could have put an express
preemption provision in the statute if that was its intent. 159 The WPP is
153
See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (explaining that the
historic police powers of the states should not be preempted unless there is a “clear and
manifest purpose of Congress”); Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 2005)
(stating that there is a “well-established principle that ‘courts should not lightly infer
preemption’”). The Third Circuit explained that this principle “is particularly apt in the
employment law context which falls ‘squarely within the traditional police powers of the
states, and as such should not be disturbed lightly.’” Id.
154
See Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 496 (8th Cir. 2002) (arguing that the
comprehensive scheme provided by the WPP is “powerful evidence of Congress’s clear
and manifest intent to pre-empt state-law whistleblower claims related to air safety”).
155
See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496–97 (holding that a federal statutory remedy did not
preempt equivalent state law remedies); Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248,
1264 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he very enactment of a federal remedy, without more, cannot
cause us to expand the scope of an express pre-emption provision to encompass and preempt all equivalent state remedies.”).
156
Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2006); see Maher, supra note 101,
at 118 (“[S]uch silence should not serve as a basis for expanding the scope of § 41713 to
cover all state law whistleblower claims.”).
157
Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006). “[A] State . . . may not enact
or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to
a price, route, or service of an air carrier . . . .” Id.
158
See Botz, 286 F.3d at 496–97 (“[W]e would expect Congress to have directed language
in the WPP to the issue of federal pre-emption only if it had been Congress’s intent that the
WPP not exert any pre-emptive effect upon state whistleblower provisions.”).
159
See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (explaining that Congress would have
enacted an express preemption provision if it believed state laws would interfere with the
statute’s objectives). Levine is a recent Supreme Court case addressing preemption of state
laws in an area heavily regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). Id. The
Court held that it was not impossible for drug manufacturers to comply with state and

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 [2011], Art. 7

242

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

silent in regards to preemption.160 Furthermore, whistleblower claims
involve employment discrimination, which is a traditional police power
of the states.161 The silence, in addition to involving a traditional police
power, supports the position that state whistleblower claims are not
preempted.162
The Eighth Circuit’s inference that enacting a federal remedy means
Congress intended all equivalent state laws to be preempted also falters
because, as the Eleventh Circuit acknowledges, this would be implied
preemption.163 Furthermore, the federal remedy cannot expand the
scope of the express preemption provision to include all equivalent state
remedies because complete preemption is inapplicable without clear
congressional intent.164 Under the complete preemption doctrine, a
statute preempts all equivalent state laws only when it satisfies two
requirements: it has an exclusive federal cause of action for the plaintiff
and it unambiguously preempts state law.165 The argument that the
federal law obligations, and state law claims do not interfere with Congress’s objectives in
the FDCA. Id. The Court reasoned that Congress would have included an express
preemption clause if that was its intent. Id. Congress’s silence regarding preemption and
the fact that Congress was aware of the “prevalence of state tort litigation” is strong
evidence that Congress did not intend federal oversight to be the “exclusive means of
ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.” Id.; see also Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263 (explaining
that the absence of a preemption provision is susceptible to more than one interpretation).
160
See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263 (stating that the WPP is silent about preemption).
“Because the WPP says nothing about pre-emption and this silences is ambiguous, we find
its enactment less probative of Congressional intent regarding the pre-emption of state
whistleblower claims than did the Eighth Circuit.” Id.
161
See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (discussing how
employment standards fall within the traditional police power of the states); Fort Halifax
Packing Co.. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987) (explaining that preemption should not be
“lightly inferred” when dealing with labor standards); Meyer v. United Airlines, Inc., No.
08 C 0599, 2009 WL 367762, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2009) (discussing how the area of
employment law falls within the traditional police powers of the states).
162
See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263 (discussing how Congress’s silence on the preemption
issue in the area of employment discrimination, which is typically controlled by the states,
does not show an intent to preempt state whistleblower statutes).
163
See id. at 1263–64 (stating that implied preemption is not applicable when the statute
contains an express preemption provision); supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text
(discussing implied preemption).
164
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496–97 (1996) (holding that a federal
statutory remedy did not preempt equivalent state law remedies); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264
(“[I]t is possible to point to a multitude of substantive contexts in which parallel state and
federal remedies exist . . . .”). “[T]he very enactment of a federal remedy, without more,
cannot cause us to expand the scope of an express pre-emption provision to encompass and
pre-empt all equivalent state remedies.” Id.; see also Siegle, supra note 46, at 1121
(explaining that complete preemption occurs “where a statute has a ‘preemptive
force . . . so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action’” (alteration in
original)).
165
Siegle, supra note 46, at 1107.
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WPP is an exclusive federal cause of action is the following: The WPP
has an appeal process through the circuit courts ensuring uniformity,
and if the WPP did not completely preempt state whistleblower claims
they would interfere with this uniformity.166 However, it is clear that
federal remedies can coexist with state remedies. 167 In addition, there is
too much ambiguity surrounding the question of whether the WPP
preempts state laws.168 Thus, the WPP fails both requirements and does
not fall under the complete preemption doctrine. 169
Second, the Eighth Circuit misinterpreted the statute’s objectives
when it reasoned that Congress furthered the goals of the ADA by
enacting the WPP.170 The Eighth Circuit held that the creation of a single
uniform standard for dealing with employees’ whistleblowing will
ensure price, availability, and efficiency of airlines by relying on market
forces and competition, rather than allowing them to be determined by
inconsistent state regulation.171 This is clearly the purpose of the ADA
when it comes to state claims that “relate to” prices, routes, or services as

See Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2006) (explaining the appeal
process if one is unsatisfied with the Secretary’s findings); Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d
488, 497 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining the uniformity that results from the WPP’s appeal
process). “By making the [Secretary’s] findings and remedy order in response to an
employee’s complaint reviewable by the federal courts of appeals, Congress insured a more
uniform interpretation of the WPP, and thus a more predictable response to public airsafety complaints . . . .” Id.
167
See Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S at 496–97 (explaining the possibility for similar federal and
state remedies to exist side by side).
168
See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64 (holding that the WPP does not preempt state
whistleblower claims); Botz, 286 F.3d at 498 (holding that the WPP preempts state
whistleblower claims).
169
See 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (providing a federal cause of action for airline employee
whistleblowers with no explicit statement that it is the exclusive remedy for such
whistleblowers); 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (2006) (illustrating the current saving clause, which
states that “[a] remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by
law”).
170
See Botz, 286 F.3d at 497 (arguing that Congress “furthered its goal of ensuring that the
price, availability, and efficiency of air transportation rely primarily upon market forces
and competition” by enacting the WPP); FISCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (stating that
“[s]afety has never been deregulated”).
171
Botz, 286 F.3d at 497.
166
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explained in the ADA’s express preemption provision.172 However, this
argument lacks merit when applied to the WPP. 173
The purpose of the ADA was to deregulate the airline industry and
promote “maximum reliance on competitive market forces.” 174 Congress
enacted the preemption provision to prevent states from interfering with
this deregulation.175 Thus, the ADA and its preemption provision
essentially deal with the economic perspective of the airline industry. 176
Whistleblower claims have to do with employment discrimination and
the safety of the airlines, not the economic, efficiency, or competitive
aspects of the airlines. 177 Therefore, safety has a tenuous, at best,
connection to “price, routes or services” of airlines.178
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit, a uniform remedy for airline
employees who report violations will not ensure price, availability or
efficiency of airlines by relying on market forces and competition. 179
This is because airlines do not compete for safety.180 All airlines must
Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2006); see Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378–79 (1992) (stating that “the ADA included a pre-emption
provision, prohibiting the States from enforcing any law ‘relating to rates, routes, or
services’ of any carrier”). Congress determined that “maximum reliance on competitive
market forces” would best benefit the airline industry by advancing efficiency, innovation,
low prices, and the quality of services. 124 CONG. REC. 30662 (1978).
173
See 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (explaining that the objective of the WPP was to
provide whistleblower protection to airline employees to encourage violation reporting
and ensure safety).
174
124 CONG. REC. 30662 (1978); see AVIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 21, at 29
(explaining that the ADA’s main purpose was “to remove government control over fares,
routes and market entry (of new airlines) from commercial aviation”). The ADA also
“maint[ains] . . . safety as the highest priority in air commerce.” Id. at 31.
175
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
176
See supra notes 27–35 and accompanying text (explaining that heavy regulation prior
to the ADA was inefficient, imposed high costs on customers, and needed to be
deregulated to ensure reliance on competitive market forces).
177
See infra notes 179–82 and accompanying text (explaining that airlines do not compete
for safety because federal aviation regulations are mandatory for airlines); see also Branche
v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the employment
discrimination claim is not an area in which airlines compete).
178
See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1261 (holding that the state whistleblower claim is not
preempted under § 41713 because it “does not relate to the services of an air carrier within
the meaning of [the statute]”); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 390
(1992) (explaining that certain state laws may not be preempted by the ADA if they affect
the scope of the statute “in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
179
See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264 (discussing how preempting state whistleblower claims
relating to safety will “not advance the pro-competitive goals of the ADA”).
180
See id. at 1260 (explaining why airlines do not compete for passengers on the basis of
safety). Passengers do not bargain for safety because “it is implicit in every ticket sold by
every carrier. Accordingly, it does not serve the purposes of the ADA to pre-empt state
law employment claims related to safety.” Id.; see also Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181
172
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comply with the same federal aviation regulations and laws; thus, all
airlines are required to be safe.181 Safety is not going to further the
purpose of the ADA and its preemption provision because it is not going
to increase “reliance on competitive market forces.” 182
Finally, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the WPP fosters fairness for
employees better than fifty inconsistent state whistleblower statutes
because it provides uniform protection. 183 However, the circuit split
regarding whether or not these claims are preempted by the WPP
contradicts the Eighth Circuit’s fairness argument. 184 The text of the
WPP is ambiguous regarding preemption; thus, airline employees
continue to bring state claims.185 While the Eighth Circuit holds that
equivalent state remedies are preempted, the majority of the circuits hold
that they are not preempted.186 This has created inconsistency among
F.3d 363, 373 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing how safety is a necessity for airlines). “Safe
operations . . . are a necessity for all airlines.” Id. Airlines do not have the option to choose
which safety standards to conform to and which ones to disregard. Id. Safety is not an
option when choosing modes of competition. Id. “For this reason, safety of an airline’s
operations would not appear to fall within the ambit of the ADA and its procompetition
preemption clause.” Id.
181
See CNN Wire Staff, Feds push $700,000 fine against Puerto Rican airline, CNN (June 28,
2010, 2:53 P.M.), http://cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/06/28/faa.airline.fine/index.html?iref=
allsearch (“‘All maintenance procedures must be followed at all times. There are no
exceptions when it comes to safety,’ FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt said.”).
182
124 CONG. REC. 30662 (1978); see FISCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (stating that “[s]afety
has never been deregulated”).
183
Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2002). “The WPP’s single, uniform
scheme for responding to air-carrier employees’ reports of air-safety violations fosters
fairness far better than a patchwork, hit-or-miss system of whistleblower protections
scattered throughout the States.” Id. The court stated:
By making the [Secretary’s] findings and remedy order in response to
an employee’s complaint reviewable by the federal courts of appeals,
Congress insured a more uniform interpretation of the WPP, and thus
a more predictable response to public air-safety complaints, than
would likely be possible if it had granted review in the courts of the
fifty States.
Id.
184
See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64 (holding that the WPP does not preempt equivalent
state remedies); Botz, 286 F.3d at 498 (holding that equivalent state whistleblower remedies
are preempted by the WPP).
185
Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that “the plain language
of the WPP is wholly silent on the issue of preemption”). The Third Circuit agrees with the
Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that “Congress’ silence renders its intent ‘ambiguous’ at best
and thus should not serve as a basis for expanding ADA preemption.” Id.
186
See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
ADA’s preemption provision is unaltered after the enactment of the WPP); Gary, 397 F.3d
at 190 (holding that the WPP does not expand the ADA’s preemption provision, therefore it
does not preempt state whistleblower claims); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264 (holding that the
ADA’s preemption clause is not altered or expanded by the WPP); Botz, 286 F.3d at 498
(holding that the WPP expands the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision).
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the courts, resulting in unfairness among the airline employees. 187 It is
unfair that some employees may bring state claims, while others may
not, especially because of the deficiencies with the WPP.188
Although the WPP provides a uniform federal remedy, its
imperfections have led many airline employees to pursue state claims. 189
The WPP requires complainants to go through a delayed investigation
process with the DOL, in which complainants are unsuccessful about
eighty percent of the time.190
Employees are also required to
administratively appeal before they can bring their claim in federal
court, and administrative appeals are unsuccessful about two-thirds of
the time.191 “The [DOL] process [is] described as cumbersome rather
than expeditious, biased rather than expert, ineffective rather than
efficient, and as limiting access to the court rather than substituting
superior procedures.”192
Thus, airline employees who want to
“advocate[ ] judicial redress” bring state claims because state
whistleblower statutes tend to rely more on judicial redress than
administrative procedures.193 Employees who bring their claims under
the WPP are not guaranteed their day in court or relief; however,
employees who bring state claims are likely to receive their day in court
in addition to a jury and punitive damages. 194 Thus, many employees

See Gary, 397 F.3d at 190 (explaining why Gary’s state whistleblower claim was not
preempted and could be brought in state court); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1262 (allowing the
state whistleblower claim brought by Branche to be heard in state court); Botz, 286 F.3d at
498 (preempting the state whistleblower claim brought by Botz).
188
See AirTran Whistleblower, supra note 117 (explaining the lengthy DOL process and the
few employees that succeed). For example:
The complaint is a common one, said Tom Divine, legal director for the
Government Accountability Project, a Washington-based non-partisan
pro-whistleblower advocacy group. The process is “slower than
molasses. It is a black hole.” In the 25 to 40 cases the [DOL] decides
each year involving complaints against corporations, similar to
Branche’s, Divine said about one-third of the cases are won by the
employee.
Id.
189
See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing the WPP’s deficiencies).
190
See AirTran Whistleblower, supra note 117 (stating that employees may encounter a
hostile environment when they bring state whistleblower claims as well); cf. notes 89–94
and accompanying text (explaining the deficiencies in the DOL’s process, and stating that
only nineteen percent of the claims are found to have merit).
191
See supra text accompanying notes 93–94 (describing the unsuccessful outcome of
appeals within the DOL regarding whistleblower claims).
192
Vaughn, supra note 102, at 621.
193
Id.
194
See AirTran Whistleblower, supra note 117 (stating that Branche “wanted the issue tried
under Florida law so that a jury could hear his case”). Some states will even allow
employees to seek punitive damages. Id.
187
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prefer state whistleblower remedies to the federal remedy.195 As a result,
state whistleblower claims will proceed, a percentage of them will be
preempted, and the unfairness among airline whistleblowers, regarding
available remedies, will continue.196
B. Legislative History and the Text of the WPP Support the View that the
WPP Does Not Preempt State Whistleblower Claims
The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits took the correct position
that state whistleblower claims are not preempted by the WPP. 197 They
applied the position that the alleged harm traditionally fell within state
power and the express preemption clause in the ADA must be construed
narrowly.198 Although silence as to preemption may be interpreted both
ways, it is crucial that Congress does not mention preemption in the
WPP.199
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, Congress’s knowledge
about the ADA’s preemption provision implies nothing about its intent
regarding the WPP.200 In fact, as the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, Congress
should have been aware that the majority of courts found state
whistleblower claims not to be preempted by the ADA prior to enacting
the WPP.201 Furthermore, when Congress is aware of “the operation of
See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (discussing the deficiencies in the federal
remedy and why employees may prefer to bring state whistleblower claims).
196
See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text (explaining how the circuit split has led
to unfairness among airline employees).
197
See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
WPP does not expand the ADA’s preemption provision and does not preempt state
whistleblower claims); Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the
WPP does not preempt state whistleblower claims); Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263–64 (holding
that state whistleblower claims are not preempted by the WPP).
198
See Ventress, 603 F.3d at 682 (analyzing preemption under “the presumption that
‘because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, . . . Congress does not
cavalierly preempt state-law causes of action’” (alteration in original)). “This is especially
true in the area of employment law, which ‘falls within the traditional police power of the
State.’” Id.; see also Gary, 397 F.3d at 190 (explaining that preemption should not be inferred
lightly when it falls within the traditional police powers of the states); Branche, 342 F.3d at
1259 (“[E]mployment standards fall squarely within the traditional police powers of the
states, and as such should not be disturbed lightly.”).
199
See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263 (“[I]t becomes significantly less clear that in saying
nothing about pre-emption in the WPP Congress was somehow indicating that it assumed
state whistleblower claims to be pre-empted.”).
200
See Maher, supra note 101, at 118 (“Congress’s knowledge of § 41713 and the Supreme
Court’s broad interpretation thereof certainly does not imply that Congress intended to
expand the scope of § 41713 to encompass all state law whistleblower claims.”).
201
See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1259–60 (citing various cases that held the preemption clause
of the ADA did not include whistleblower claims); Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d
590, 597–98 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the connection between a claim for retaliatory
195
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state law in a field of federal interest” and has tolerated it, the argument
for federal preemption is “particularly weak.” 202
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit’s position is supported by
legislative history.203 The main objective of the WPP was to provide
whistleblower protection to “airline employees so they can reveal
legitimate safety problems without fear of retaliation.” 204 Whistleblower
protection for airline employees was one of the “important safety
initiatives” in the legislation.205 The WPP was included in the legislation
“to aid in our safety efforts and protect workers willing to expose safety
problems.”206 Therefore, legislative history clearly supports the position
that the goal of the WPP was to increase the level of safety in the airlines
by encouraging violation reporting.207 However, the legislative history

discharge and airline “services” was too remote to be preempted by the ADA); Espinosa v.
Cont’l Airlines, 80 F. Supp. 2d 297, 301 (D.N.J. 2000) (rejecting the argument that the state
whistleblower claim was related to the quality of services of an airline and preempted by
the ADA); see also Maher, supra note 101, at 118–19 (explaining how the majority of cases
prior to the enactment of the WPP did not find that the ADA preempted state
whistleblower cause of actions).
202
See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989)) (discussing how there is no strong argument
for preemption when Congress has allowed state law to exist in an area of federal interest).
203
See H.R. REP. NO. 106-167, pt. 1, at 85 (1999) (“Private sector employees who make
disclosures concerning health and safety matters pertaining to the workplace are protected
against retaliatory action by various Federal laws.”). “These employees have become
known as ‘whistleblowers.’” Id. Before the WPP was enacted, “[t]here [were] no laws
specifically designed to protect airline employee whistleblowers.” Id. Airline employees
are private sector employees, and the WPP was “specifically designed” to protect them. Id.;
see also AirTran Whistleblower, supra note 117 (stating how private sector employees also
have protection from the states).
204
146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000). Congress intended the WPP to protect airline employees
who report violations and encourage them to come forward. Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 106-513,
at 216 (2000) (explaining that Title VI of the bill “[e]stablishes procedures to protect
whistleblowers”). Title VI “[p]rohibits airlines and their contractors or subcontractors from
taking adverse action against an employee whom provided or is about to provide (with
any knowledge of the employer) any safety information.” Id. But see Thomas M. Devine &
Donald G. Alpin, Whistleblower Protection—The Gap Between the Law and Reality, 31 HOW. L.J.
223, 224 (1988) (arguing that statutes are not effective in protecting whistleblowers).
205
146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000).
206
146 CONG. REC. 2178 (2000). But see Whistleblower Bill Would Help FAA With
Enforcement, Unions Say, AVIATION DAILY, Jul. 15, 1996 at 71 (stating that the Air
Transportation Association believed formal complaints and enforcement proceedings
under the WPP would impede rather than encourage violation reporting).
207
146 CONG. REC. 2178 (2000) (“We also have provided whistleblower protection to aid
in our safety efforts and protect workers willing to expose safety problems.”).
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does not state that the WPP was intended to be an exclusive remedy for
whistleblowers.208
State law should not be preempted if it furthers the objectives of
federal law, and state whistleblower claims clearly further the WPP’s
objectives by providing protection for airline employees, encouraging
violation reporting in airline industry, and thus increasing aviation
safety.209 The purpose of the WPP was to encourage violation reporting
and ensure safety in the airline industry by “provid[ing] protection for
airline employee whistleblowers.” 210 Affording both state and federal
whistleblower protection would allow even more protection for airline
whistleblowers, thus further encouraging airline employees to report
safety violations in the airlines. 211 If airline employees have two
remedial choices at their fingertips, the fear of retaliation will be
significantly suppressed.212
Congress intended to protect airline
208
See generally 146 CONG. REC. 2178 (2000) (explaining that whistleblower protection
would aid in safety efforts); 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (explaining that Congress intended
the WPP to protect airline whistleblowers and encourage them to come forward).
209
See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders &
Contractors of Mass., 507 U.S. 218, 224 (1993) (discussing how state law should not be
preempted unless it frustrates the federal scheme); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 256 (1984) (explaining that preemption should be judged on whether or not the state
standard frustrates the objectives of the federal law); Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 139,
at 100 (discussing the legal protection states provide for whistleblowers). “Whistleblower
protection statutes have been enacted in each of the fifty states. All of these laws have the
same objectives [sic]: to expose, deter, and curtail wrongdoing.” Id.
210
H.R. REP. NO. 106-167, pt. 1, at 85 (1999). Title VI of the reported bill would provide
protection for airline employee whistleblowers by prohibiting the discharge or other
discrimination against an employee who provides information to its employer or the
federal government about air safety or files or participates in a proceeding relating to air
safety. Id.; see 146 CONG. REC. 2178 (2000) (explaining that whistleblower protection would
“aid in our safety efforts”).
211
See Taylor, supra note 6 (explaining how the courts and the administrative arena are
the most effective forums for whistleblowers). The author stated:
[T]he courts and the administrative arena are the forums where the
whistleblower can get the most effective personal protection from
retaliation for whistleblowing and the most comprehensive relief for
the injuries they suffer at the hands of their adversaries. It also can
provide an effective arena to hold culpable parties accountable for
their actions in specific types of situations.
Id.
212
See OSHA, AIR21 and Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 914 (explaining the
benefits of increasing whistleblower protection). The author explained:
The theory behind increased whistleblower protection is that “the
more money and other remedies available to the employee, the more
hesitant the employer will be to take negative job action.” Therefore,
the stakes need to be high enough so that employers will not be
tempted to wrongfully retaliate against whistleblowing.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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employees who report violations; thus, it seems more plausible that
Congress would embrace a state law that provided additional
whistleblower protection, further encouraging such reporting, rather
than preempt it.213
C. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach and its Detrimental Effect on Airline Safety
The Eighth Circuit’s approach is detrimental to the future of aviation
safety because it preempts all state whistleblower claims, thereby
suppressing future violation reporting in the aviation industry. 214 If
airline employees fear they will not be protected from retaliation, they
will choose not to report violations.215 The purpose behind enacting a
federal remedy for aviation industry whistleblowers is to ensure that the
airlines maintain a high standard of safety.216 The aviation industry is
unique in respect to other industries because violation reporting protects
the millions of people who fly each day by ensuring their airplanes are
safe for flight.217
Conversely, in support of the Eighth Circuit’s approach, violation
reporting can impose frivolous claims and higher costs on the airlines. 218
Thus, “[p]rofit and loss cuts two ways in airline safety.” 219 Airline
See 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (explaining that the intent of Congress was to protect
airline employees who report violations).
214
See Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 496–98 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that state
whistleblower claims are preempted by the WPP); 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement
of Patricia A. Friend) (discussing how employees are reluctant to come forward with
violations even when they have whistleblower protection).
215
See OSHA, AIR21 and Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 914 (discussing the
difficult choice employees must make when deciding whether to report a violation). “No
employee should be put in the position of having to choose between his or her job and
reporting violations that threaten the safety of passengers and crew.” Id. at 913–14.
216
See 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (explaining that the purpose of the WPP was to
encourage airline employees to come forward and to aid in Congressional safety efforts in
regards to the airlines).
217
See 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining how
large quantities of accidents could be prevented if airline employees discover and report
safety concerns).
218
See Jason M. Zuckerman, Minimizing the Risk of Whistleblower Retaliation Claims (Spring
2004) (explaining how the airlines face several regulatory and economic challenges).
Airlines cannot afford more whistleblower claims. Id. In addition to increased costs,
whistleblower claims create increased negative publicity. Id.; cf. id. (recommending that
airline employees familiarize themselves with the whistleblower protection that is available
to them in an effort to minimize their exposure to retaliation claims).
219
Ronald John Lofaro & Kevin M. Smith, Rising Risk? Risking Safety? The Millennium and
Air Travel, 25 TRANSP. L.J 205, 213 (1998)
When any air carrier is in financial trouble . . . there are only a few
ways open to cut costs: Reduce the “quality” and training of both
flightcrew and mechanics, reduce the “quality” of the maintenance and
213
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employees are protected under the WPP and various state claims for
alleged violations, not just actual violations.220 Thus, increased violation
reporting may result in more reports of alleged violations, which
heightens the risk of false reporting. 221 Furthermore, if airline employees
are allowed to bring state whistleblower claims, the airlines risk the
possibility of more lawsuits and larger damages. 222 Airline employees
may also face increased costs from taking planes out of service to comply
with maintenance regulations.223 Despite these arguments, safety
remains the ultimate priority in the aviation industry, and
“[w]histleblower protection is sound public safety policy.” 224

outsource all you can. . . . When carriers need to save money, they may
try to operate at or below minimums. Result? The safety margin
evaporates and is replaced by a rising risk.
Id.
See Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 495 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The [state] statute’s
authorization to refuse assignments is not limited to actual violations.”). The state
whistleblower statute “extends to any assignment which the flight attendant has an
objective, factual basis merely to believe is in violation.” Id.
221
See Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2006) (indicating that
frivolous claims are subjected to fines).
222
AirTran Whistleblower, supra note 117 (discussing how state whistleblower claims will
result in higher costs for the airline). Jeffrey Pasek, a whistleblower litigation specialist,
stated: “‘It opens up a lot more courthouses where these cases can be tried,’ . . . . In
addition, some states will permit employees to sue supervisors as well as seek punitive
damages.” Id.
223
MARY SCHIAVO, FLYING BLIND, FLYING SAFE 48–49 (1997) (discussing the costs of
safety). Schiavo stated:
At its core, safety isn’t cost-effective. Recommendations for changes in
airline practices, for new equipment, for improved safety rules were
evaluated not in terms of how many accidents they might prevent or
lives they might save, but in terms of how many dollars they would
cost the airlines, aircraft builders, parts manufacturers or fleet
maintenance companies.
Id. An important issue for the airlines to address when determining whether to perform
maintenance, and thus comply with regulations, is “how much it would cost the airlines in
lost revenue while planes were pulled out of service.” Id. at 49.
224
See 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (discussing how
“Americans would be shocked to learn that flight attendants, pilots and mechanics today
can be fired for reporting a safety violation.”). Patricia A. Friend, International President of
the Association of Flight Attendants, stated:
To place workers in the position of risking their career when they
report safety concerns to the FAA or Congress is poor aviation policy.
Would American airline passengers want to fly on an airline with an
unwritten company policy that gags its workers’ safety concerns? I
certainly doubt it. Whistleblower protection is sound public safety
policy.
Id.; cf. Zuckerman, supra note 218 (stating that over 210 claims were filed, and many
employees succeeded in obtaining meaningful recoveries).
220
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The Eighth Circuit disregarded the public policy behind
whistleblower protection in the aviation industry. 225 It is important to
encourage violation reporting in the airline industry to ensure a high
level of safety.226 In recent years, there have been many problems with
the airlines and their compliance with regulations.227 Although the
number of accidents per year has decreased dramatically in the last
decade, the number of violations and the amount of fines imposed on
airlines continues to increase.228 It is evident that the airlines are
See 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (statement of Rep. Shuster) (explaining that Congress
intended the WPP to encourage airline employees to come forward and report violations);
FISCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 10 (explaining the concern that the airline industry has fallen
into complacency regarding safety); Taylor, supra note 6 (stating that the world would be
more dangerous and deceitful if whistleblowers lacked the courage to come forward).
226
See 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining that
airline accidents could be avoided if airline employees discovered safety violations and
reported them to proper authorities who acted upon them in an adequate manner).
227
See Ahlers, Southwest settles with FAA for $7.5 million, supra note 138 (“Southwest
operated 46 of its Boeing 737 jets on nearly 60,000 flights without performing mandatory
inspections for fatigue cracks in their fuselages.”); Mike M. Ahlers, FAA levies more fines
against American Eagle regional airline, CNN (Feb. 17, 2010, 8:27 P.M.),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/02/17/american.eagle.fines/index.html?iref=allsea
rch [hereinafter Ahlers, FAA levies more fines] (stating that American Eagle airlines “flew
four Bombardier regional jets on more than 1,100 flights between February and May 2008,
with main landing-gear doors that had not been repaired as ordered by the FAA in August
2006”); FAA proposes a $1.45 million fine against Northwest Airlines, supra note 138 (stating
that “32 of the carrier’s 757s flew more than 90,000 passenger flights between December 1,
2005 and May 27, 2008, while not in compliance with the airworthiness directive”); Michael
Ahlers, US Airways, United face FAA fines for safety violations, CNN (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-14/travel/us.arilines.fines_1_faa-united-airlinesairways?_s=PM:TRAVEL [hereinafter Ahlers, US Airways, United face FAA fines] (stating
that “US Airways operated the eight aircraft on a total of 1,647 flights last fall and winter
while the planes were in a potentially unsafe condition”). United Airlines involved one
aircraft that flew over 200 times in an unsafe condition. Id.
228
See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 10. Illustrating the statistics over the last decade:
Between 2002 and 2006, there were nine fatal accidents involving
commercial air carriers, four of which involved passenger fatalities.
The accident rate over this period was roughly one fatal accident for
every ten million hours flown (0.01 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight
hours). By comparison, a decade earlier, during the period from 1992
through 1996, fatal airline accidents were occurring at a rate of about
one every 3.7 million flight hours (0.027 fatal accidents per 100,000
flight hours). Thus, the fatal airline accident rate has been reduced by
a factor of about 2.7 over the past decade.
Id.; see Ahlers, FAA levies more fines, supra note 227 (“The [FAA] . . . proposed a $2.9 million
fine against American Eagle Airlines for allegedly conducting more than 1,100 flights using
planes with landing-gear doors that had not been repaired as prescribed by the FAA.”);
Ahlers, Southwest settles with FAA, supra note 138 (“Southwest Airlines will pay $7.5 million
to settle complaints that it flew unsafe aircraft, and the fine will double unless the airline
completes additional safety measures within a year . . . .”); Ahlers, US Airways, United face
FAA fines, supra note 227 (“The FAA is seeking a $5.4 million fine from US Airways and a
225
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suffering from a complacent attitude, which can have a detrimental
effect on air safety.229 Complacency in the aviation world has resulted in
several accidents; thus, it is important that airlines avoid falling into a
“false sense of security” due to their low accident rate. 230 Airlines must
comply with mandatory regulations to ensure their successful safety
record continues; one mishap can result in hundreds of lives lost.231
Furthermore, the violations incurred by airlines over the recent years are
violations that should have been reported. 232 It is essential that airline
employees are provided sufficient whistleblower protection to encourage
Aviation
violation reporting and ensure our skies are safe.233
$3.8 million fine from United Airlines for unrelated violations.”); American Airlines fined
$7.1 million for safety violations, CNN (Aug. 14, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-0814/travel/american.airlines.faa_1_faa-inspector-american-airlines-md-80?_s=PM:TRAVEL
(“Federal regulators announced $7.1 million in fines against American Airlines . . . .”);
CNN Wire Staff, Continental faces fine for FAA violations, CNN (July 27, 2010, 2:51 P.M.),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/07/27/continental.faa.fine/index.html?iref=allsear
ch (“Continental Airlines faces a fine of $230,000 for violations of Federal Aviation
Administration regulations . . . .”); FAA proposes a $1.45 million fine against Northwest
Airlines, supra note 138 (“Federal aviation regulators . . . propos[ed] a $1.45 million civil
penalty against Northwest Airlines for operating nearly three dozen of its Boeing 757
planes without proper windshield wiring inspections.”).
229
FISCHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 10. Explaining that despite the decrease in fatal airline
accidents:
[S]ome aviation safety professionals and some Members of Congress
have expressed concern that the industry and regulators may have
been lulled into complacency with regard to safety. This concern has
been heightened recently in response to various findings that airlines
have failed to fully comply with aircraft inspections and repairs
mandated by the FAA.
Id.
230
See ALEXANDER T. WELLS & CLARENCE C. RODRIGUES, COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY
149 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the dangers of complacency in commercial aviation).
“Complacency or a false sense of security should not be allowed to develop as a result of
long periods without an accident or serious incident. An organization with a good safety
record is not necessarily a safe organization.” Id.; see also Lt. Col. Devon McCollough,
Commentary, Why Worry About Complacency?, U.S. AIR FORCE (July 23, 2010),
http://www.lajes.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123214637 (explaining the importance of
staying “alert for hazards” and avoiding the complacency attitude in aviation).
Complacency has been a major factor in several aviation accidents and incidents. Id.
231
See McCollough, supra note 230 (discussing the problems with complacency).
“‘Complacency kills’” is a popular saying in the aviation world. Id. Even when the
accident rate is low, it is important to stay “vigilant” and detect hazards before they result
in accidents. Id.
232
See 1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining how
some airlines continue to fly airplanes when safety is compromised).
233
See 146 CONG. REC. 2814 (2000) (statement of Rep. Shuster) (explaining that the WPP
was enacted to encourage airline employees to come forward and report violations);
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 139, at 100 (stating that the objectives behind state
whistleblower statutes are the same).
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whistleblowers should not be retaliated against; rather, the public should
be grateful for their efforts to ensure passenger safety. 234
Airline employees, such as mechanics and pilots, are “trained and
skilled safety professionals” who work in and around aircrafts daily. 235
They have firsthand experience of the problems that can threaten the
safety of an air carrier in flight. 236 Therefore, aviation employees “should
be able to step forward and report their concerns” when an “airline
decides to compromise safety in order to lower its costs.” 237 However,
“without strong whistleblower protections, employees are reluctant to
come forward and many safety problems could go unreported.” 238 Many
of these employees stay silent in fear of being retaliated against.239 In
order to encourage violation reporting, airline employees must know
their career is not on the line. These employees are more than entitled to
sufficient protection; therefore, state whistleblower claims should not be
preempted by the WPP.240
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Since the enactment of the WPP, the circuit courts have generated
confusion as to whether the WPP expands the scope of the ADA’s

See OSHA, AIR21 and Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 913 (explaining that
aviation employees “perform an important public service when they choose to report
safety concerns”); Taylor, supra note 6 (stating that the world would be a more dangerous
place without whistleblowers’ acts of courage).
235
1996 Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of John J. Duncan, Chairman).
236
See id. (explaining that airline employees are the best people to report safety violations
because they have experience with the certain problems and violations that can threaten
the safety of an airplane in flight).
237
See id. (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining that the result of reporting a
violation in the airlines will be “a safer, stronger airline and industry”). Patricia A. Friend
stated:
Airlines argue that they monitor their own safety and encourage
employees to bring forward their concerns. For many airlines, this is
true.
Yet, judging by the number of fines, groundings and
investigations by the Federal Aviation Administration, we know that
some airlines do cut corners and compromise safety. Nonetheless,
airlines committed to safety have nothing to fear in this legislation.
Id.
238
Id. (statement of John J. Duncan, Chairman S. Comm. on Aviation).
239
See id. (statement of Patricia A. Friend) (explaining how she has “received reports of
incidents from several other airlines where supervisors have threatened and harassed flight
attendants in an effort to deter the reporting of safety violations”). It is difficult to
encourage employees to come forward with violations, even when they have
whistleblower protection. Id.
240
See id. (explaining airline employees’ entitlement to whistleblower protection).
234
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preemption clause.241 The courts’ inconsistent application of the WPP
has resulted in state whistleblower claims being heard in some courts,
while being completely preempted in others.242 Preempting state
whistleblower claims will decrease the amount of whistleblower
protection given to airline employees, which will suppress future
violation reporting and have a detrimental effect on the overall safety of
the airline industry.243 Therefore, the conflict must be resolved to ensure
the highest level of safety in the airlines. 244
Accordingly, this Part proposes two solutions to ameliorate the
circuit split concerning whether the WPP preempts equivalent state
claims.245 First, this Part proposes an amendment to the WPP, which
expressly indicates that state laws are not preempted.246 Alternatively,
this Part proposes that the Supreme Court grant certiorari, uphold the
majority position, and clarify “services.”247
A. Proposed Amendment to the WPP
This section proposes an amendment that will ensure state laws are
not preempted under the WPP.248 In addition, the amendment will make
it clear that a claim may not be brought under both the WPP and an
equivalent provision of law.249 Consequently, the proposed amendment
will guarantee that the statute is interpreted consistently among the
circuits.250 The proposed amendment, and its recommended subsection,
is as follows:
241
See supra Part II.E (discussing the circuit split concerning whether the WPP preempts
state whistleblower claims).
242
See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text (illustrating the different conclusions
reached by the courts regarding the preemptive effect of the WPP); supra Part III.A
(discussing the non-uniformity among the courts regarding the preemption of state
whistleblower claims and the unfairness that has resulted among airline employees).
243
See supra Part III.C (examining the detrimental effect the preemption of state
whistleblower claims will have on airline safety).
244
See infra notes 253–70 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of amending the
WPP to include the proposed amendment).
245
See infra Part IV.A–B (discussing two proposed solutions to resolve the circuit split).
246
See infra Part IV.A (proposing an amendment to the WPP that will resolve the circuit
split and benefit the airline industry).
247
See infra Part IV.B (proposing a model test to apply when determining preemption
under the WPP).
248
See infra text accompanying notes 248–70 (proposing a no-preemption clause be added
to the WPP indicating that state whistleblower claims are not preempted).
249
See infra text accompanying note 252 (proposing an amendment that will prevent
employees from bringing two equivalent causes of action for the same unlawful act).
250
See infra text accompanying note 252 (explaining how the amended WPP will
expressly indicate that state whistleblower claims are not preempted, resulting in a
uniform interpretation of the WPP).
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Proposed Amendment to 49 U.S.C. § 42121251
(f) No Preemption: The WPP shall not preempt or diminish any other
safeguards provided by Federal or State law against discharge of an employee or
discrimination against an employee in violation of subsection (a). An employee
shall not seek protection under both this section and another provision of Federal
or State law for the same allegedly unlawful conduct of the employer. 252
Commentary
The proposed amendment is the most beneficial solution regarding
statutory remedies because: it is a simple fix that indicates state claims
are not preempted; it provides consistent application of the WPP among
the circuits; and it provides airline employees with an option other than
the WPP’s investigative process through the DOL.253 The amended WPP
will increase the amount of whistleblower protection for airline
employees, encourage airline employees to report violations, and
promote the highest level of safety in the airlines. 254
First, the amended WPP will increase whistleblower protection by
providing airline employees with the option of pursuing a federal or
state claim.255 A no-preemption provision will explicitly indicate that the
WPP is not the sole remedy for airline whistleblowers. 256 The result will
be a consistent interpretation of the WPP among the circuits. 257
Therefore, the amended WPP will provide airline employees with more
Whistleblower Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(2006).
This proposal is the contribution of the author. The proposed amendment is italicized
and was modeled after 6 U.S.C. § 1142(e)–(f) (2006). For purposes of this amendment,
retaliatory discharge shall be defined according to the common legal usage. See BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 530 (defining retaliatory discharge as “[a] discharge that
is made in retaliation for the employee’s conduct (such as reporting unlawful activity by
the employer to the government) and that clearly violates public policy”). See generally 6
U.S.C. § 1142(e)–(f) (2006) (providing a no preemption clause and an election of remedies
clause).
253
See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text (discussing the process one must go
through with the DOL when pursuing a claim under the WPP).
254
See infra notes 253–70 and accompanying text (discussing the impact the amended
WPP will have on the airline industry).
255
See OSHA, AIR21 and Whistleblower Protection, supra note 77, at 914 (explaining the
benefits of increasing whistleblower protection); supra notes 183–96 and accompanying text
(discussing the inconsistency among the circuits in allowing state whistleblower claims and
the unfairness that has resulted among airline employees).
256
See supra text accompanying note 252 (illustrating the text of the no-preemption
provision that should be amended to the WPP).
257
See supra notes 134–35 (stating the different holdings reached by courts when
confronted with the issue of whether the WPP preempts state whistleblower claims); infra
text accompanying notes 253–70 (explaining the benefits of allowing state whistleblower
claims to be brought by airline employees).
251
252
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protection when their employers retaliate against them for reporting
violations to the airline or the FAA.258
Consequently, the amended WPP will encourage violation reporting
to the FAA.259 The additional protection will entice airline employees to
report safety violations to the FAA, even though states afford varying
levels of protection to whistleblowers.260 If violation reporting is
increased, the FAA’s safety program will be more successful, airlines will
not get away with as many violations as they currently are, and airline
safety will not be compromised. 261 Furthermore, the WPPs objectives
will remain unchanged with the addition of the proposed amendment
because the amendment shares the WPP’s purpose of encouraging
airline employees to come forward with violations by giving them
proper protection when employers retaliate against them. 262 In fact, the
amended WPP will advance the purpose of the WPP by providing more
protection to airline employees, thus encouraging more violation
reporting and ultimately increasing the amount of violations that are
reported.263
Although the amended WPP may result in higher costs and more
litigation for the airlines, it will promote the highest level of airline
safety.264 The FAA created a program to protect information submitted
to the FAA.265 The program was intended to encourage airline
employees, such as pilots and mechanics, to report violations to the FAA,
which would aid in the efforts of increasing safety in the aviation
However, when there is insufficient whistleblower
industry.266
See supra Part III.C (discussing the benefits of increased whistleblower protection).
But see Susan Sauter, The Employee Health and Safety Whistleblower Protection Act and the
Conscientious Employee: The Potential for Federal Statutory Enforcement of the Public Policy
Exception to Employment At Will, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 513, 513 (1990) (arguing that state
whistleblower claims cause inconsistent and erratic results in state courts).
259
See supra Part III.B (discussing how the WPP was enacted to encourage violation
reporting).
260
See supra Parts III.A–C (explaining why state whistleblower laws should not be
preempted by the WPP).
261
See supra Part III.C (explaining the importance of violation reporting and its effect on
safety).
262
See supra Part III.B (discussing the legislative history of the WPP); supra notes 204–08
(indicating that the WPP’s objective was to encourage violation reporting and ensure
safety).
263
See supra Part III.C (discussing how sufficient whistleblower protection will encourage
violation reporting).
264
See infra text accompanying notes 264–70 (indicating that the amended WPP will
promote safety in the airline industry).
265
See supra note 77 (explaining the safety program of the FAA).
266
See supra notes 235–36 and accompanying text (explaining that airline employees, such
as pilots and mechanics, are the best identifiers of violations due to their first hand
experiences).
258
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protection, people fail to report violations due to their fear of employer
retaliation.267 Thus, by ensuring a sufficient amount of whistleblower
protection and encouraging airline employees to report violations, the
amended WPP will aid the FAA in its mission “to provide a safe, secure,
and efficient global aviation system.” 268 Airlines must conform to
regulations to ensure every plane is airworthy before it flies to its
destination carrying hundreds of passengers. 269
Ultimately, the
amended WPP benefits the public as a whole by ensuring violations are
reported to the proper authorities and that no plane takes off when it
fails to comply with regulations.270
B. The Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorari, Adopt the Majority Position,
and Clarify “Services”
This section proposes an alternative solution to the circuit split—
adoption of the majority position and clarification of “services.” 271 The
ADA’s preemption provision has only been interpreted twice by the
Supreme Court.272 After the Morales test was established, some circuits
adopted a narrow definition of “service” and others adopted a broad
definition.273 The WPP further complicated the Morales analysis when it
was amended to the ADA without clearly addressing preemption of
state whistleblower claims.274 Therefore, the Supreme Court should
grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split regarding whether the ADA, as
amended by the WPP, preempts state whistleblower claims.275
The Court should adopt the view taken by the Third, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits, which held that the WPP does not preempt state

See supra notes 238–39 and accompanying text (noting airline employees’ fear of
reporting violations due to possible retaliation by their employers, and how this can affect
the number of violations that are reported and safety in flight).
268
See supra note 5 (quoting the mission of the FAA); supra Part III.C (discussing the
importance of reporting violations to the FAA to ensure the highest level of safety).
269
See supra Part III.C (discussing the importance of ensuring each plane is safe and
airworthy before it takes off).
270
See supra note 234 and accompanying text (explaining that the public should be
grateful for airline employees who blow the whistle).
271
See infra notes 275–94 and accompanying text (proposing that the Supreme Court
adopt the majority position and a clear interpretation of “services”).
272
See supra Part II.C (discussing the two Supreme Court cases that interpreted the
ADA’s preemption clause).
273
See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (discussing the different definitions of
“service” adopted by the courts).
274
See supra Part II.E (illustrating the different views taken by the circuit courts after
enactment of the WPP).
275
See supra notes 271–74 and accompanying text (proposing why the Court should adopt
the majority position and reverse the Eighth Circuit).
267
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whistleblower claims.276 The majority position should be adopted, and
the Eighth Circuit overturned, because the mere enactment of a federal
remedy is not evidence of Congress’s “clear and manifest purpose” to
preempt of all equivalent state remedies.277 However, adoption of the
majority position will not resolve the circuit split unless an additional
step is taken: clarification of “services.” 278 If the majority position is
upheld, the ADA’s preemption provision encompasses state
whistleblower claims that relate to “services.”279 Thus, the Court must
address whether whistleblower claims fall under “services” to ensure
they are treated consistently among the circuits. 280
The Morales test fails to consider the WPP’s objectives because it was
established solely for the ADA’s preemption provision. 281 The Court
should consider the purpose of the ADA in conjunction with the WPP’s
objectives when clarifying “services” regarding state whistleblower
claims.282 The ADA and its preemption provision were enacted to
deregulate the airlines, ensure maximum reliance on the competitive
market, prevent states from regulating the newly deregulated industry,
and make airlines more customer-friendly.283 The WPP was enacted
twenty-two years after the ADA to encourage violation reporting and
ensure airline safety.284 Therefore, the meaning of “services” in Morales
must be clarified with respect to the WPP and its objectives.285
The Court should adopt a case-by-case analysis that consists of two
steps: (1) determine if the state whistleblower claim adversely affects the
“services” of an airline, such that it interferes with the airline’s ability to
See supra Part II.E.2 (explaining the majority position).
See supra text accompanying note 159 (stating that Congress would have enacted an
express preemption provision in the WPP if it intended to preempt all state whistleblower
statutes).
278
See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity of the term
“services”).
279
See supra Part II.E.2 (discussing why the WPP does not expand the scope of the ADA’s
preemption provision, and further explaining why the only issue to determine is whether
the state whistleblower claim relates to “services”).
280
See Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the state whistleblower claim was not preempted because it did not relate to “services” of
an airline); cf. Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 496–97 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
state whistleblower statute related to “services”).
281
See supra notes 54–66 and accompanying text (discussing how Morales interpreted the
ADA’s preemption provision).
282
See supra Part II.A–B (discussing the purpose of the ADA and its preemption
provision); supra Part III.B (discussing why the WPP was enacted).
283
See supra Part II.A (explaining that the ADA was enacted to deregulate the airlines).
284
See supra Part II.D (discussing the enactment of the WPP).
285
See supra Part II.C (discussing the interpretation of the ADA’s preemption provision);
supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text (explaining that the WPP is related to safety and
not economic factors such as the ADA).
276
277
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compete in the market, and (2) balance the adverse effect the state claim
has on airline competition against safety. 286 If airline competition is
adversely effected, the state whistleblower claim interferes with the
ADA’s objectives.287 The proposed test balances this interference against
safety, which is the WPP’s main objective. 288 Thus, both statutes’
objectives are taken into account when determining preemption of state
whistleblower claims under the ADA.289 Factors to consider under safety
include: (1) the effect preemption of the claim will have on future
violation reporting; (2) the seriousness of the violation; (3) past conduct
of the airline concerning previous violations; and (4) the amount of time
between detecting the violation and complying with the violation.290
The proposed clarification of “services” considers congressional
intent and ensures that state whistleblower claims are not preempted if
they further the values and goals intended by the WPP. 291 The new
interpretation of “services” also deters frivolous claims by preempting
state whistleblower claims when the proper circumstances exist, such as
when their adverse effect on airline competition outweighs safety
concerns.292 Granting certiorari, adopting the majority approach, and
clarifying “services” regarding whistleblower claims will resolve the
circuit split by providing an approach that can be applied successfully
and consistently among the courts. 293 Furthermore, this solution gives
airline employees the opportunity to pursue state whistleblower claims,
which benefits the airline industry similar to the proposed amendment
discussed in Part IV.A:
Airline employees will have increased
whistleblower protection, which will encourage violation reporting and
promote safety in the airline industry.294
V. CONCLUSION
Dave would benefit from either of the proposed solutions. The
amended WPP would give Dave the option to pursue either a state or
This proposed test is the contribution of the author.
See supra Part II.A (discussing the history and purpose behind the ADA).
288
See supra Part III.B (stating the objectives of the WPP).
289
See supra text accompanying note 286 (explaining how to incorporate the goals of each
statute into an analysis to determine if state whistleblower claims fall under “services”).
290
These proposed factors are the contribution of the author.
291
See supra Part III.B (explaining the goals Congress intended when it enacted the WPP).
292
See supra text accompanying note 286 (explaining that state whistleblower claims are
preempted if their interference with airline competition outweighs the safety concerns).
293
See supra text accompanying note 286 (proposing a test that clarifies “services,” which
can be applied consistently across the circuits).
294
See supra notes 255–70 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of allowing
state whistleblower claims to be brought by airline employees).
286
287
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federal claim. Thus, Dave would be allowed to proceed with his state
whistleblower claim and avoid the hassle involved with filing a
complaint with the DOL. The court would also find that Dave’s claim is
not preempted by the WPP if it applied the majority position with the
new “services” analysis. Even if the court found his claim was related to
“services” and interfered with the ADA’s objectives, the court would
find that the safety concerns in Dave’s case strongly outweigh the
interference, and Dave would succeed in pursuing his state claim. There
is no “clear and manifest purpose” of Congress regarding preemption of
state whistleblower claims under the WPP. If Congress intended such a
result, it would have enacted an express preemption provision in the
statute. Furthermore, airline employees deserve proper whistleblower
protection. Providing airline employees with both state and federal
remedies will increase the amount of whistleblower protection available
to employees, which will encourage violation reporting and ensure that
safety in the airlines remains a top priority.
Therefore, state
whistleblower claims should not be preempted by the ADA, as amended
by the WPP.
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